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In continuation of a student project initiated in 
the last quarter of academic year 1968-1969, the 
editorial staff of the Management Quarterly is pleased 
to present to its readers four course work papers 
written by students at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
The papers were selected for their excellence in terms 
of broad-based appeal, readability, and infonnative 
value . 
Succeeding ed•i torial staffs will continue to con-
sider for publication all student papers submi tte -d from 
every education and research department of the Naval 
Posgraduate School. It is the editors' opinion that a 
continuation of this expanded approach to the Management 
Quarterly will benefit the readers by providing a broad 
spectrum of interesting topics within or related to the 
general field of military managemen t and/or operations . 
In order to ensure a continuo us input of student 
papers to the editorial staff, a Student Mail Center box 
(SMC 1499) has been designated for Management Quarterly 
use on a permanent basis. Submission by faculty members 
of suitable midterm papers, research work, and term 
projects reports will be accepted at any time. We also 
believe that the Quarterly offers students the unique 
opportunity to have their research efforts recognized, 
and we invite those students who feel that their recent 
academic efforts might be of interest to oth ers to pro-
vide the editorial staff with a copy of the work involved. 
The views expressed in the Management Quarterly are 
those of the authors exclusively, and in no way reflect 
the attitude or endorsement of the Department of Defense, 
Navy Department, or the Naval Postgraduate School. 
We are particularly grateful to Professor Edward J. 
Laurance, Commander Jon C. Tibbetts, CEC, USN and 
Professor John D. Senger for their cooperation and 
assistance i n identifying papers for inclusion in the 
Management Quarterly. Our appreciation is extended in 
acknowledgement of the guidance and help provided by our 
advisor, Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Sagehorn, USN. 
EDITORIAL STAFF 
Lieutenant Commander Larry D. Myers, CEC, USN 











Paul S. Lewis 
The stress on humans to reorganize their per-
ceptions of reality in order to deal with 
various factual revelations in our enormously 
expanding society has forced mankind to seek 
more advanced and less human means of keeping 
pace with the changes. The computer has burst 
so rapidly on today's scene to help fill man-
kind's insatiable needs for speed, versa-
tility and capacity in the reorganization 
process that many may now argue that the 
0 compt::.ter revolution" that is taking place, 
which was originally perceived to serve 
mankind, may eventually "shape" the thoughts 
of men's minds as well. 
The author approaches the subject of com-
puter impact on thinking primarily from the 
viewpoint of those people who must con-
sciously apply themselves to the use and 
understanding of the computer - mankind in 
general, The author concludes with a dis-
cussion on mankind keeping the computer in 
its proper perspective, one that he considers 
as a "useful tool" and not "as an end in 
itself," 
This paper was submitted to Professor John D. 
Senger in partial fulfillment of the course 
requirements for Individual and Group 
Behavior (MN 2106). 
The Editors 
--------------------------------------------------------
Lieutenant Paul S. Lewis received his B.S. from the U.S. 
Naval Academy in 1972, He is presently a candidate for 




Philosophers throughout the ages have delved into 
the question of how man thinks and what conditions shape 
his thinking. In every new era of advancement and dis-
covery many humans have tried to reorganize their per-
ceptions of reality in order to deal with various factual 
revelations. Today, the stress for this reorganization 
process has accelerated to such an extent that many are 
unable to keep pace with the changes. 
At times new modes of thinking have been simply ex-
perimental or transient. At other times a change in the 
environment has helped to shape man's thinking. Now, in 
the twentieth century, the computer has arrived. The 
computer has the speed to process in less than one day the 
whole of recorded history, and can calculate in micro-
seconds what it took some men years to calculate by hand. 
Man's mind shaped the computer, and now the computer has 
the ability not only to serve, but to shape the t houghts 
in man's mind as well. 
This paper will concern itself primarily with t hose 
people who must consciously apply themselv es to the use 
and understanding of the computer. It is recognized that 
although hardly anyone can escape the impact of computer 
technology entirely, many can dissociate themselves from 
the least involvement or understanding of it. Therefore, 
the computer may not directly affect all peoples' thinking 
process. However, the importance lies in the fact that 
people who are involved in computer technology are a 
significant segment of the population in a very wide range 
of occupations. 
THE COMPUTER AND STRUCTURED THOUGHT 
Thinking is still an undefined process. I once saw 
a poster with the word "Think!" for a caption with a 
picture of a cup of steaming black coffee. These two 
symbols together gave me a certain image. But what men-
tal process transpired? Was only a cerebral cortex at 
work? No, there were subtle emotions involved in my 
i mage . To pose another example, such as in calculus, one 
learns to solve certain integrals "by inspection," that 
is, by simply knowing a rule and applying it through 
recognition of a type of problem. In both cases, a 
fairly undefined process occurs in the mind. Whatever 
i t is, it is very natural. There are an infinite num-






many attending nuances of thought for each situation. 
However, one can say that thinking occurs on both the 
conscious and subconscious levels and includes both con-
crete symbols and abstractions. 
Perhaps the easiest mode of thinking to describe, 
and one upon which the computer is based, is reasoning, 
or problem solving. Reasoning is a highly conscious form 
of thought, which is, " .• • directed, controlled, active, 
intentional, forward looking, and goal oriented. 11 1 But 
thinking invariably leaves the realm of highly conscious 
reasoning for the realm of abstraction and generalization, 
a realm which is the antithesis of defining computer opera-
tions. Defining computer operations, or programming the 
computer, forces the individual to think along the highly 
conscious lines of logic and reasoning, skills which are 
not easily developed in thinking. Dr , R. W. Hamming 
illustrates the problem the computer presents to the 
thinking process: 
As an example of over1:1ight, years ago in a 
calculus class I taught a certain process 
called "integration by parts," yet, when I 
now try to give a description to a machine 
I find that there are many details I do not 
understand well enough to write out a program 
for the machine. The students had the im-
pression, along with me, that they understood 
the process., • • 2 
The computer duplicates some very laborious thought 
processes at blinding speeds and often in a more accurate 
manner. The computer performs a process which must be 
completely defined by programming . Such definition re-
quires thought of a very highly conscious nature and such 
minute definition has forced man to a closer look at a 
gross breakdown of conscious thought processes. 
Most people view the computer as an extremely complex 
piece of equipment when they confront it and try to make 
it work, It is complex, but this is due to a dissimilar 
complexity in human thinking. To illustrate this, one can 
consider the three concepts of integration, differentia-
tion, and logic and see that these are fu n ctions of the 
human mind and of the comp~ter's repertoire of machine 
skills. A curiosity arises here. For the machine, logical 
step-by-step analyses and solution of problems are most 
straightforward and requires less computer effort. The 
processes of integrating inputs for modeling or differen-
tiating inputs through decision making processes require 
J 
complex appLication. Every process must also be quan-
tified with numbers. 
For man, on the other hand, the integration and dif-
ferentiation occur on an abstract level without require-
ments to define all the input stimuli. A human becomes 
more enmeshed in the rudiments of step-by-step logic which, 
for him, becomes more laborious than integrating and dif-
ferentiating multiple coreplex inputs. So as man, the 
natural integrator and differentiator, confronts the 
machine, he is forced to organize his mind with the laws 
of logic and explicit detail. When working with the com-
puter, humans find themselves in an extremely structured 
and logical mental environment. Men cannot work success-
fully in this atmosphere without proper training. 
COMPUTE,3 EDUCATION AND THINKING 
In approaching the pr·oblem of how man thinks, one 
might accept the idea that man thinks the way his educa-
tion shapes him to think. So it is important that ex-
posure to computer technology be introduced into the aca-
demic routine at an early age, even in elementary schools. 
Since computer technology is here to stay, education must 
prepare the minds of people to cope reasonably well in a 
compt,.terized society. Proper application cf comp1..1.ters in 
the education system will avert much of the confusion 
which results from sudden bombardment by computer tech-
nology. 
John Henry Martin, Superintendent of Sch ools in Mt. 
Vernon, New York, told a congressional committee: "Public 
education is the last great stronghold of the manual 
trades ••• In education, the industrial revolution has 
scarcely begun.") This indictment of the school system 
suggests that the computer is not a part of educat i on as 
it shot8.d be. The key to familiarity with the computer 
is interaction with it, Hopefully, such exposure would 
spare individ~als depersonalization and estrangement as 
they perceive a hostile computerized enviror.ment. For 
those who will find their professions in the computer 
fie l d, early expcsure to computers and knowledge of their 
diverse applications would hopefully evoke individual 
creativity, These who will work with the computer should 
develop 2. bread awareness in order to avoid Hfunctional 
fixedness, " that is, mental enelavement to one functional 
ap:i,-lication of computer technology. 







be involved in more than purely scientific courses. 
George E. Forsythe discusses a second type of course in 
the universities which he calls computer appreciation. 
Such a course deals more with the cultµral level and the 
meaning of computers in today's world.4 He states: 
I wish mainly to note that every university-
educated person must become informed of these 
contemporary problems. These topics might 
be included in courses su r veying contem-
porary civilization ••• But it will take con-
siderable discussion and writing to keep 
humanistically oriented faculty aware of 
such fast-moving technical developments. 
It may be noted, in passing, that large 
automatic digital computers make ideal 
tea9hing machines, and teachers of factual 
subject matter should be aware of these 
possibilities.5 
Teaching computer appreciation, technology, and its 
application is one facet of influencing thought, but use 
of computer methods for teaching itself can also affect 
thinking, specifically when one gets into the area of pro-
grammed instructions. B. F . Skinner and his associates 
developed the technique of 11programmed instructions" in the 
1950's.6 Probably most college students have had contact 
with programmed instruction or kr.ow someone who has. The 
technique has value for specific applications, such as 
teaching job related skills in the military or industry. 
However, since the purpose of the programmed text is to 
teach by rewarding right answers and specifying a certain 
behavior, it is m~ch more difficult to apply the technique 
to academic courses in the humanities.? Charles E. 
Silberrr.an relates how programmed texts can affect thought: 
If programrr ,ing is used too extensively, more-
over, it may prevent the development of in-
tuitive and creative thinking or destroy such 
thinking when it appears. For one thing, 
programming instruction seems to force a 
student into a relatively passive role, where-
as most learning theorists agree that no one 
can really mast er a conc ept unless he is 
forced to express it in his own words or 
actions and to construct his ovm applications 
and examples.B 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that prograrnrr.ed instruc-
tions are valuable for numerous r ot e s kills as long as 
5 
one realizes it is not the panacea for every teaching 
problere. The total human learning experience must allow 
for philosophical thinking and exchange. In this, the 
comp~ter is limited because it works ultimately according 
to the laws of logic and logic is a closed system. If a 
person dedicates himself solely to computer usage he 
dedicates himself to a finite system of reasoning. Human 
thinking is capable of abstraction, perception, intui-
tion, and values beyond the realm of computer technology. 
One of the key points in educating people to think 
with the computer is to prevent the computer from be-
coming a substitute for thought. Neophtes may be duly 
impressed with the capabilities of the computer, but edu-
cators must ensure that students maintain a proper per-
spective of it's role. George E. Forsythe comments on 
what this role should be: "Technical students and faculty 
must become aware of the power of computers as extensions 
of the human mind. 11 9 Mr. Forsythe goes further to stress 
the importance of university students realizing the socio-
logical and intellectual implications of a computer world, 
and to consider what computers mean for man's thinking, 
employment, and social organization.10 He then says: 
..• it is essential that the technical student 
become thoroughly conversant with computers 
during his university period. His reason 
for studying computing is the same as that 
for studying mathematics, English, or other 
basic analytical subjects, to acquire a 
fundamental background for application to 
whatever problems he will later encounter.11 
Perhaps the ultimate objective of computer education then 
is to learn to communicate with the computer in order to 
use it more effe ctively. 
Education must not substitute studies in computer 
technology for other subject matter, but educators should 
incorporate computer technology as an added dimension 
wherever possible, especially in the courses not related 
specifically to technology. Involvement with the computer 
forces people to think more logically and George E. 
Forsythe comments on its possible impact in a math class: 
Besides introducing concepts and structure, 
mathematics courses are expected to teach how 
to actually solve important classes of al-
gorithms whereby the mathematical statement 
of a pro blem is transforme~ into some repre-







Though math requires logic skills without the computer, 
the added dimension of computer information in regular 
math classes is serving the purpose of teaching students 
how to communicate with the computer. Students must re-
main prepared in the basic learning tools of reading, 
writing, and arithmetic, but in today's world, computer 
education needs to be a part of these basics. 
THE COMPUTER AND QUANTITATIVE THINKING 
One major impact of the computer has been in the 
attempt to quantify much of the rational thinking in 
various fields of endeavor. To use an example, one of 
the areas in which this has become extremely evident is 
in the field of management. In discussing the long range 
effects of the computer, Fred G. Withington discussed 
the changes of thinking in management: 
Management faces a harder job than before. 
Instead of sitting back and relying on ex-
perience and judgement ..• it will be forced 
to look at quantitative relationships be-
tween the organization and environment in 
a degree of detail that has never been pre-
viously required .••. It is already clear 
that the younger candidates for management, 
and recent graduates of business schools, 
are thinking in terms of quantitative re-
lationships, models, and statistical infor-
mation far more than their predecessors 
did.13 
Quantitative thinking exists in the decision-making 
process due to the computer requirement that every input 
and output be quantified in some fashion. Men are thus 
defining the use of the computer in one sense to model 
their own thought process and to relieve themselves of 
occupying some of the traditional roles, such as middle 
management. But the role of the computer as middle 
manager almost becomes a practical necessity. It is 
nearly impossible for the human mind to organize and 
judge the over-abundance of data the computer produces. 
Only the computer can do it quickly and accurately. 
Though quantitative analyses can allow for more in-
formed decision-making in the management environment, 
there may be negative side effects, Again Mr. Withington 
states: 
7 
Once decision rules have been established 
which optimize the elementary decisions of 
the organization, there will be a natural 
tendency to rely totally on these decisions--
to assume that the superior wisdom of those 
who established the rules, and the superior 
capacity of the computer system in admin-
istering them, leaves no room for judgement 
or interpreta~ion on the part of the agent 
on the spot . 1...-
It is evident that despite the computer's tremendous poten-
tial to support human thinking and intelligence, it can 
most certainly narrow one's vision. 
The question then arises as to whether the computer 
stifles creativity since using it requires such highly 
structured thinking. The computer can hamper creative 
thought; but this need not be so. One way a manager can 
"lose sight of the forest because of the trees" is his 
total dependence on a computerized decision-making model. 
Or, he may totally adhere to computerized information from 
a data base management system. Another example where one's 
thinking is locked into the computer's way of accomplishing 
a task is the case where a subordinate suggests an alter-
native and the boss says, •'The computer can't handle that . " 
The boss appears to be functionally fixed to the already 
established operating system. 
Some computer addicts are oblivious to the creative 
process. If one becomes a strict proponent of "facts and 
figures only" decision-making, which computer technology 
makes very attractive, the capacities for judgement and 
intuition are completely wasted . If creative thought can, 
in reality, be reduced to facts and figures, it is usually 
only in the final analysis. If top management tells the 
person with an original idea that it •• sounds good., but to 
present the facts and figures first to justify it, they 
may have missed the golden egg . This is not to say that 
such a situation exists in every business that relies on 
computer information . It just means that proper judge-
ment and intuition have as much of a place in thinking in 
the computer environment as they did prior to the com-
puter age. Part of the problem exists because of the 
expense of incorporating a computer management information 
system and the reluctance to use extra dollars for flexi-
bility in the system. Thus t the business finds the com-
puter driving almost everything . 





of the computer, creativity is feasible. Edward Venache 
discusses the problem of creativity in the organization. 
Important is promoting the disciplined gearing 
of expression to desired outcomes, that is, 
the mastery of appropriate skills and their 
direction toward creative products. Spon-
taneity is not solely opposed to conformity 
but may also be inchoate without guidance 
toward significant goals. Thus we face two 
problems, not solely the release of spon-
taneity, but also its effective utilization. 
Development entails both release and direc-
tion of creative potential,15 
One cannot blame the computer or the organizational struc-
ture for a lack of creativity, but one can blame the obtuse 
management depicted in the prior examples. While creativity 
among computer personnel and management will exist within 
some framework, this is not as restraining as it may seem. 
Popular concepts of creativity often deny that creative 
thinking can occur in a structured environment. Popular 
belief that divergent thinking, with freedom of impulse 
and absence of restraints, results in creativity. John G. 
Nicholls refutes this, saying research does not bear this 
out, that just because something is original does not mean 
it is creative. He says that true creativity is charact-
erized by task committment and guided primarily by the 
materials with which one is working,16 There is truth to 
this when one considers the refinement of computer tech-
nology itself. So it seems that it is not computer tech-
nology which would stifle creativity, but those who would 
control the use of the computer. 
MAN AND MACHINE COMBINATION 
0 One of the measures of intelligence is the amount of 
knowledge a person has at his command. Likewise, one of 
the measures of the computer is its ability to retrieve in-
formation. This information may be obtained from data 
stored within the computer, or result from calculations 
the programmer feeds to it. If computers are applied pro-
perly, they can serve to escalate the productivity of the 
over-all thinking process by making vast reservoirs of 
information available at the right time. In fact, they 
are being used for that today in a very effective manner. 
Chris Mader and Robert Hagin supplement this idea in dis-
cussing the importance of computer information systems: 
9 
. • • packaged programs can act as a form of 
canned expertise, so that the expert 
sp e cialist's knowledge may be captured , 
in part~ in a decision-aiding program or 
model .lo 
As stressed in the previous section, man is not being re-
lieved of his responsibility to think on his own. However, 
with the computer he can now process much more informa-
tion and in a fraction of the time it previously took. 
J. C. R. Licklider discusses a 0 man-computer sym-
biosis," or partnership of man and machine with the pur-
pose of draw i ng out the best possible thinker. The ulti-
mate purpose of such a symbiosis is not to work on pre-
formulated problems with pre-determ i ned sequences, but to 
be able to meet the unknown and to solve problems.19 Mr. 
Licklider goes on to state his idea of the work of such 
a partnership: 
... operations that fill most of the time 
alle gedly devoted to technical thinking are 
operations that can be performed more effec-
t i vely by machines than by men. Severe 
problems are posed by the fact that these 
operations have to be performed on diverse 
variables and in unforeseen and continually 
changing se quences. If these problems can 
be s olved in such a way as to create a sym-
biotic rela t ionship between a man and a fast 
information-retrieval and data-processing 
machine .. • it seems evident that the cooper-
ative interaction would greatly improve the 
thinking process.20 
Martin and Norman, in The Comput§rized Society,21 dis-
cuss man-machine capabilities further. Despite the exten-
sion of human thinking capabilities with the computer, 
there are still many types of thinking that the human does 
best. But the best way to carry out certain difficult 
operations and processing is throt.gh the man-machine com-
bination. For example, language translation is a task 
where human processing is very slow, but computer pro-
cessing is fast, ho~ever inexact. The human is needed 
to correct machine imperfections. 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, humans think most 
naturally on the integrated level. To apply complex logic 
requires extreme conscious concentration. Unfortunately 







process. Therefore, the symbiosis of man and computer 
can also be viewed as -providing man with an artificial 
yet powerful adjunct in memory and concentration. The 
computer completes the problem solving process without 
inhibitions in micro-seconds. Such symbiosis does not 
necessarily cause a change in thinking, but it can ex-
pand the capacity £or intellectual productivity, pri-
marily through speeding up many traditional thought 
processes. 
Human communication with the computer is central to 
the man-machine symbiosis concept. Thinking precedes 
meaningful communication. Thoughts may be verbalized or 
symbolized for communication with another human. However, 
one thrust in today's world is to learn how to translate 
the phenomenon of human communication processes into 
quantitative terms in order to use the computer more 
effectively, The computer is in nearly every field of 
society since it is such a great facilitator of informa-
tion flow. Since so much of the communicating with the 
computer must be of a quantative nature, applied thinking 
in these fields is developing along quantitative lines. 
Engineering psychologist, Alphonse Chapanis of John's 
Hopkins University, worked on human communications and 
the computer. He says: 
If we co~ld specify in precise quantitative 
terms exactly how we hear and recognize 
speech, engineers would have no difficulty 
in building a speech recognition machine ... 
It is our inability to describe our be-
havior fully in exact mathematical terms 
that is the chief obstacle standing in the 
way of our attempts to design conversa-
tional computers.22 
It seems, then, that Mr. Chapanis views such a mathematical 
model as the break-through that could truly adapt the com-
puter to the human way of thinking and communicating. He 
comments further on the pre s ent failure to match the com-
puter to the needs of the people who must use it: 
However apt it may be to say tha t the inter-
action between man and the computer is a 
conversation, we have to add, in all fair-
ness, that most of thes e conversations are 
stilted, esoteric, and frustrating. Perhaps 
even more important, communication with com-
p"t;,ters requires thought patterns and processes 
that are, at best, unfamiliar for most people 
and, at worst, unnatura1. 23 
11 
Thust if one can describe communication in quantitative 
terms it would appear to be a major step towards com-
bining man and machine into a viable and productive unit. 
Furthern '.cre t such a definition of human communication 
may develop a deeper insight into thinking than at the 
highly conscious level. Man seems to be thinking more 
and more about "thinking 0 itself as he evolves his 
interactive process with the comp~ter . 
CONCLUSIONS 
Computer technology has opened up a new world to 
the mind, This has occurred with respect to access and 
collection of information, calculation of complex problems, 
decision-making, simulation models, plotst graphics, and 
in stressing detailed logical analysis, to highlight a 
few areas. , Without the computer , man would not have 
reached the moon, no r could he venture ir.to areas where 
some of the answers to mar1 • s f1.ture needs may lie. But 
what will the philosophers a:nd historians say of this 
age? They may speak of it as an age when man defined 
everything in quantifiable terms and had to adap t hi::. 
thir.kir.g towards finite and for mulated systems of thought 
in order to cor.1rnunicate with the computer. Dr. R. W. 
Hamming said the following: 
The Computer Revolution is often cornpa.red 
with the fa mous I ndustrial Revolution in 
importance and scope. The Industrial Revo-
lution effectively released man from being 
a beast of burden; the Computer Revolutio n , 
will similarly release him from slavery to 
dull, repetitive routine. The Computer 
Revolution , however, is perhaps better 
compa.red with the Copernican Revolution 
or the Darwinian Revolution, both of which 
greatly changed man's idea of
4
himself and 
the world i n which he lives. 
The important question which arises is whether man will 
keep the computer in proper perspective . 
Will men use the computer as a beneficial assistant? 
Or will the computer become an insidious institutional 
monolith which drives an impenetrable bureaucracy? In 
the latter . case, man would be only a subservient, 
peripheral device, and h i s thinking would be non-
productive . Hopefully, this would not occur. The rea-
son is that economics an d high cost are what often 







production is continually decreasing in expense. In 
addition, the modular concept; i.e., a greater distri-
bution of data bases and variable access to these from 
different systems and .places allow man to be more flex-
ible in his use of the computer. 
In the final analysis, the thrust of the computer 
age for thinking is to find the optimum combination of 
man and machine for mental productivity. During this 
search, it is paramount that man views the computer as a 
useful tool and not as an end in itself. Man m~st main-
tain and further develop his powers to think on the 
abstract and intuitive levels. Man must remember the arts 
and the spirit. To do so is to remain human. 
lJ 
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U.S. ARMS SALES 
AND THE 
LONG TERM NATIONAL INTERESTS 
by 
Alvah L. Rogers 
U.S. arms sales have been the subject of con-
tinuing debate over the years. The author ex-
amines the reasons - past and present - which 
have been offered in support of U.S. arms sales 
and as an academic exercise offers opposing 
views of why "hard, cold national interests" 
demand cessation of arms sales to foreign 
governments. 
The potential of preventing nuclear prolifera-
tion by providing nations with conventional 
arms is discussed followed by a counterpoint 
argument concerning self-sufficiency of nations 
against their opponents. The author poses 
the questions "Does ... self-sufficiency serve 
as an acceptable justification for providing 
arms ... ?" and then moves into the issues of 
internal security and human rights as strong 
U.S. arguments for providing arms to dictator-
ships and various repressive leaders in the 
name of preventing the spread of communism. 
The paper concludes with a list of policy con-
siderations representing radical departure 
from past U.S. arms transfer policies. 
This paper was submitted to Professor Edward J. 
Laurance in partial fulfillment of the course 
requirements for Problems of Security 
Assistance and Arms Transfers (GV 4140). 
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U.S. ARMS SALES AND THE LONG TERM NATIONAL INTEREST 
0 When I was turning over i n my mind what I might 
say that would be helpful, and I have to be very 
careful because of my past r esponsibilities in 
connection with this matter - I arrived at what 
may seem to you a half-baked conclusion, that 
the best way would be to decide what is the 
idealistic solution. 
Now, what is the idealistic solution to this 
business? After you have decided on that, we 
will mold that, trim it down and put it on a 
practical basis; there would be many amendments, 
many modifications, and some introductions. 
You have got to keep the idealistic in mind, 
there is the spiritual involved in this thing." 
- General George Marshall, speaking 
to a group of di stinguished "China 
Hands" called together on 6, 7, and 
8 October, 1949 by Secretary of State 
Kcheson to propose an American foreign 
policy toward the new China of Mao 
Tse-tung. 
INTRODUCTION 
The time is near when it will be necessary to halt 
all sales of American-made weapons of war. The arms trans-
fer process has evolv ed to a point at which every national 
interest argument in support of arms sales has been effec-
tively disproven. Presen t arms sales continue, based upon 
outworn °national interest" pronouncements which no one is 
actively, publicly examining in terms of currency and 
validity. This paper examines the reasons - past and 
present - which have been offered in support of U.S. arms 
sales and offers opposing explanations of why hard, cold 
national interest demands cessation of arms sales. 
The history of arms traffic is a.t least subliminally 
known by most peopl e . The detail of attempts at arms con-
trol, such as the Nye Commission of the mid-19J0s and the 
recent, often confl i ct i ng, Cor.gressional attempts to 
limit arms transfers, is not generally known, nor is such 
knowledge necessary to the following exposition. What one 
must know, in general, is that for over forty years 
American governmental decision-makers have consistently 






participation was not desirable, but, for an enormous 
variety of reasons, those same decision-makers have 
stopped well short of any action which would have ·been 
effective in removing the U.S.A. from the arms trade 
process. Some of our reasons for spreading lethal arms 
were good ones at the time. Providing American arrr,s to 
our post-World War II allies - on a grant-aid basis -
can be seen as a logical service to American interests. 
However, far more often our decision-makers leaked 
at arms traffic as an unavoidable phenomenon ana they 
limited their action to placing constraints upon only the 
more flagrant and notorious of arms deals, During this 
forty years, Congress has shown an ever-increasing in-
terest in restraining our involvement in arms traffic, 
but even this increased interest has produced no land-
mark legislation to definitively address the issue. 
Instead, Congress has produced eyewash restraints such 
as the Nelson Amendment, by which it granted itself veto 
authority over arms sales. To date it apparently has not 
yet chosen to exercise that authority . The Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, in whie;h one would expect to find 
an anti-arms traffic institutional bias, has been legis-
latively tasked with commenting impartially on the impact 
of arms sales, but it has responded with favorable recom-
mendations in 95% of the cases to come before it for 
consideration. The basic issue of · today - whether arms 
sales serve the national interest - is simply not 
addressed. 
As this increasing legislative concern and restraint 
have developed, the liberal legislators, i.e., those in 
the forefront of action to curtail arms sales, have 
hoisted themselves upon their own moralistic petard. 
Having fought their way through many legislative skirmishes 
they now find themselves faced by petrodollar giants who 
(1) can afford arms and economic/social programs, and (2) 
have serveral things America both needs and has come to 
rely upon. The liberals instinctively know the oil-rich 
prospective purchasers simply present a modern variant 
of the historic arms sale conundrum, but they find that 
their conventional moralistic attack is stopped cold by 
the equally conventional argument, backed by forceful 
balance of payment, defense cost reduction, and defense 
industry maintenance considerations, that trade and 
profit, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable, 
strongly objectionable aspect, also serve the national 
interest. 
When specific arms sales questions arise, defense 
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industrialists flex their political muscle, employment 
considerations are weighed - along with re-election 
thoughts - and finally the clinching argument wins the 
day, to wit: If America doesn't sell arms, then someone 
else will, In short, the moralistic argument fails. 
Seasoned Foreign Service officers are sometimes known by 
cold observation that " if your only reason for a foreign 
policy decision is a moral one, you probably have no 
valid reason at all." Liberal legislators, who tend to 
shy away from such a callous and politically unproduc-
tive conception, would do well to ponder its implications 
for the arms sales question. If moralism fails, as it 
clearly has, and the strong suspicion lingers that arms 
traffic is not a "proper business," then why not look 
for (and propose) solid reasons why the arms merchants 
should finally be pensioned off, and dispense with the 
endless, ineffectual piece-meal restrictions on arms 
sales? 
For example, Leslie Gelbl has recently offered "some 
very modest proposals" to further restrict arms sales in 
which he reviews and criticizes nine of the most common 
justifications for arms sales . Mr. Gelb's critique and 
his proposals are perceptive and cogent, but they suffer 
a fatal failure of will to attack the problem head-on. 
He pleads inability to make useful generalizations about 
large, recent arms sa l es to Saudi Arabia and Iran "because 
there are too many exceptions, 112 but he does zero in on 
what should be our central concern. 
Decisions to s ell or not to sell will be 
no better than the policies that embrace 
them. These polic i es should look to long-
term effects and should not be at the ser-
vice of momentary "needs."3 
Given the multiplicity of .. reasons" why we should 
sell arms, Mr. Gelb's nine points, which were taken with 
acknowledged conceptual liberty from the list of consid-
erations Secretary Kiss i nger offered to the House Com-
mittee on International Relations hearings on the Inter-
national Security Assistance Act of 1976, provide as good 
a springboard as any other for reconsidering the 12.!lg -
term American nationa l interest. They are, in no 
l ogically discernibl e order: 
1. Preventing Nuclear Proliferation 
2, Self-Sufficiency 






4. Alliance Relationship with Industrialized 
States 
5. The Strategic Balance of Power 
6. Regional Balances of Power 
7, Conflict Resolution 
8. Base and Transit Rights 
9, General Political Influence 
PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
The thrust of this argument is that we can prevent 
sovereign nations such as Pakistan and Iran from acquiring 
a n~clear capability by supply±r.g them with conventional 
arms sales. France offered to sell to South Korea, 
Pakistan and Iran nuclear reprocessing plants which pro- 1 
duce weapons-grade plutonium from the spent fuel from 
nuclear rea·ctors. Secretary Kissinger used conventional 
arms sales as a manipulative tool to forestall purchase 
of the reprocessing plants, Mr. Gelb faults Kissinger's 
agreement to sell A-7s to Pakistan as a precedent-setting 
example of bribery to avoid blackmail and conjures up 
visions of many developing countries threatening to buy 
reprocessing plants in order to secure conventional arms 
which would ot~wise be denied them. Mr. Gelb's 
criticism is valid, but stops short. 
The goal of preventing nuclear proliferation is 
logically valid. Certainly, at least delaying acquisi-
tion of nuclear weapons by politically unstable developi~ 
countries would serve the American national interest, 
However, the trade-off of conventional weapons sales in 
the hope of accomplishing either of those goals is justi-
fiable only to the extent that a predictably certain long 
term impact can be made upon the nuclear potentiality of 
the recipient countries, Although it should be obvious 
that neither Pakistan nor Iran ,surrendered their 
sovereignty or their future nuclear policy prerogatives 
in exchange for A-7 or F-16/F-14 aircraft, we have chosen 
to believe such to be the ca'.'se. Pakistan has mastered 
the art of playing off the U.S.S.R,, the U.S.A. and 
China (PRC) against each other to forward her own goals 
and can be expected to continue exercising the art. 
The Shah of Iran has increased purchases of Soviet 
nuclear power technology, and he is allowing Soviet ships 
to visit Iranian ports and Soviet photo-reconnaissance 
flights over his country.~ The Shah's determination to 
act with sovereign independence is an undisguised fact. 
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And yet, we expect to hamstring his acquisition of a 
nuclear capability. It should be patently obvious 
that any assurances of nuclear forebearance ws receive 
must of necessity be highly problematical of fulfillment. 
Another question implicit in the "blackmail" aspect 
of this argument is whether the presumed purchaser ser-
iously intends to acquire a nuclear capacity. For 
example, the Shah, whose veracity and sincerity is the 
presumed basis for our apparent open-ended commitment 
to sell him conventional arms, denied in a Newsweek 
interview any intention of -ultimately acquiring a nuclear 
arsenal. 
Q, Many people are su spicious that you 
ultimately hope to build a nuclear 
arsenal. 
A. It is just the oppos i te, as a matter 
of fact. Some people might {think) 
that maybe a safety device for a small 
country is to have atomic weapons, as 
the best guarantee not to be attacked. 
But I have adopted just the opposite 
(position). If you want to defend 
your country, defend it by convent i onal 
means. If t here is somebody wi shing 
you ill, he will have to use atomic 
weapons. And it won't be so easy in 
this world, .• , I don't consider myself 
so weak as only to depend on a few 
sil l y atomic bombs, but on the con-
trary, on a strong, modern ha.,rd-
fighting conventional force.) 
Now, we can't have it both ways. There either is or is 
not a serious intent to acquire nuclear capability, and 
if there is no such intent the nuc l ear nonproliferation 
argument is not germane to the sale of conventional arms. 
The insufficiency of the argument that conventional 
arms sales will prevent or materially delay nuclear pro-
liferation is more apparent if one projects the presumed 
dread consequence of our not allowing the sales. ~ust 
suppose, for purposes of argument, that either Pakistan 
or Iran had opted to buy the nuclear reprocessing plants, 
How long would it be before either country could produce 
a threatening quantity of nuclea r weapons and an effec -
tive delivery system which would pose a credible threat 






Paul Erdman has postulated in The Crash of '726 a 
power-mad Shah holding the world at ransom with a handful 
of nuclear bombs. It is good fiction, and a popular 
theme given the recent "nuclear terrorist" concerns. 
It does not, however, reflect the real world of inter-
national nuclear politics. A sovereign country can 
not act with the same impunity a terrorist enjoys. The 
People's Republic of China exploded its first nuclear 
weapon in 1964 and has actively emphasized its nuclear 
program since that date. Nonetheless, her nuclear 
capability continues, thirteen years later, to be little 
more than a minor annoyance to its "preferred enemy," the 
U.S.S.R. Given the discrepant sizes of the two forces, 
China has no option but to base her nuclear strategy on 
the comparatively passive concept of ultimate national 
defense. China, like the superpowers, must face the 
likelihood ,of national suicide as the logical outcome of 
first use of nuclear weapons in war. As would be the 
case with Iran and Pakistan, China would face over-
whelming odds in any nuclear exchange. 
The drawback to employment of nuclear weapons, as 
the superpowers have learned, is that one must first be 
certain of one's own national survival, and to date no 
country has acquired a sufficiently reassuring defensive 
and first strike capability. If the Shah were to ''go 
nuclear" it would require many years and massive external 
technological cooperation and assistance before he had 
anything approaching a useable weapons capability. And 
if Iran, with all her wealth, would face a formidable 
problem, Pakistan's potential for nuclear force develop-
ment is simply ludicrous. In either case, the goal of 
delaying the spread of nuclear weapons will be met by the 
industrial and economic imperatives inherent in develop-
ment of the weapons. 
The foregoing should have made it clear that the 
nuclear nonproliferation argument is a sham. It is only 
the most recent example of sophistry in justifying arms 
sales. The true underlying argument is the same one 
which will be seen to appear time and again. Sales= 
profit. Profit in trade= national good. 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
Countering the self-sufficiency argument for arms 
sales provides one of the most, if not the most, n7ttle-
some philosophical challenges to opponents of American 
arms sales. Mr, Gelb's selection of Taiwan, Israel and 
2J 
South Korea offers pointed illustrations of the problem. 
He notes that true military self-sufficiency against all 
opponents is a rhetorical rather than real goal of policy, 
and focuses upon the actual goal of self-sufficiency 
against each recipient country's regional enemies, The 
ironic nub of the self-sufficiency argument is that arms 
sales proponents offer moralistic reasons for the arms 
sales. Liberal legislators find themselves cornered by 
their own brand of moral precepts: a nation should have 
the right to secure weapons it needs to defend itself 
against aggressioni America, by its past action, has a 
moral responsibility to help these nations defend them-
selves, 
Pragmatic arguments follow close behind: it is better 
to arm these nations for their own defense than to send 
American troops for their defensei the world looks to us 
to support our allies, and our national credibility hinges 
upon our continued support of client nations identified 
with America; Communist expansion must be contained for 
the good of humanity . These arguments have been con-
vincing reasons for support of Israel, Taiwan and South 
Korea, and they are unquestioned articles of faith as re-
gards our NATO allies and Japan. Arms sale proponents do 
not overlook industrial considerations for such sales, but 
find no need to employ them because of the common accep-
tance of the logical and historic basis for continuing the 
sales. 
Mr . Gelb recognizes this situation and his critique 
of the self-sufficiency argument is restrained. He does 
note the anomalies which require us to tether our allies 
so as to preclude their making first and aggressive use of 
arms we have provided. He also points to American efforts 
to encourage co-production of F-5Es as an advantageous 
factor if a future administration were to abrogate the 
defense treaty with Taiwan, and acknowledges the diffi-
culty which would support for Taiwan creates when we seek 
to advance our relations with the People's Republic of 
China. 
Despite all the foregoing quibbles and qualifications, 
the present writer sees the heart of the self-sufficiency 
argument for arms sales as a question of whether support 
for our free world allies necessarily includes the sale 
of arms and concludes that it does not. Taking the most 
difficult of the examples first - our NATO allies and 
Japan - it can be seen that sale of American arms is a 






NATO ALLIES: Two of the major weapons issues, the 
F-16 and the NATO tank, illustrate the point. In both 
instances, European defense industries have developed 
effective competing weapons systems. NATO-wide purchase 
of the European designed weapons would have stimulated 
both European defense industries and the European econ-
omies. However, America pulled out all the stops to push 
the final decisions in favor of American industries, Our 
NATO friends finally and resentfully have succumbed to 
colossal "Buy American" pressure in the case of the F-16, 
Obviously, our concern was not self-sufficiency for 
Europe. We sought to achieve substantial profits at the 
expense of long term regional self-sufficiency and per-
haps at the greater cost of shamel e ssly exposing our real 
motivations. 
JAPAN: In the aftermath of the Nixon Doctrine, the 
possible rearming of Japan to fill the power vacuum 
created by American withdrawal became a major concern of 
Asian nations. The Shanghai communique produced an added 
sense of urgency which reached panic proportions when 
South Vietnam and Cambodia fell to the communists, 
Fortunately, the "Nixon shocks" alerted Japan to her po-
tential vulnerability and she responded, not with the 
feared resurgence of militarism, but with an immediate 
step-up in her diplomatic and economic relations with her 
neightors. The push for Japanese rearmament has been 
far more American-inspired than Japanese-inspired, The 
econorr.ic advantage of having to support only a miniscule 
self-defer.se force has not escaped Japanese notice , 
Self-sufficiency for Japan - against either the 
U.S.S.R. or China - is a Chimera. Providing pain-
exacting island defense against cor.ventional invasion is 
possible, but Japanese industry is fully capable of pro-
viding the necessary armaments for such a defensive 
posture. 
The large-scale purchase of American arms must be 
recognized as a highly destabilizing factor politically, 
It threatens China and Japan's Second World War victims 
psychologically, and at the same time it impedes the 
advance of Japanese-inspired and directed industrial 
development throughout Asia. America's long-term in-
terest, vis-a-vis Japan, lies in maximizing Asian 
economic development through Japan's good offices. 
Attempting to establish, through American arms sales, 
an impossible defensive self-s~fficiency for Japan can 
only impede the Southeast Asian nation's acceptance of 
close econorr.ic relations with Japan. 
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TAIWAN and SOUTH KOREA: These two countries offer 
unmatched examples of the philosoph i cal complexity of 
arms sales, A host of considerations arises human rights; 
propping up dictators; communist containrr.ent; past 
actions - both righ t and wrong - and their implications 
for future Am8rican policy, Our eventual course in South 
Korea is beginning to appear with increasing cla .ri ty. 
Human rights issues are slowly forcing a reduction in 
American support. America's future policy toward Taiwan 
is less clear, but the zest for normalizing relations 
with the PRC has p1Jshed the possibility of our abandoning 
Taiwan entirely out of the realm of the phi l osophical/ 
theoretical and into the world of real possibility and 
active consideration. Senator Mansfie l d closed his 
l egislative career with a thoughtful, considered, and 
forthright call for the recognition of Peking in com-
pliance with the Shanghai Communique,? 
Conventional policy formulations for South Korea 
and Taiwan proceed on the assumption that both countries 
wi l l fall to communi st aggression if America does not pro-
vide them with arms. Further discussion t ends to cease 
at that point, and th e formulations may well be correct, 
However, other arms suppliers are available t o fill the 
gap. And, it shou l d be not ed that in both cases we are 
already moving to abroga t e our open-end e d comrritment to 
the countries. Given that both possess substantially 
developed industria l capacities , how long is American 
obl igated to provid e special support for these regimes? 
North Vietnam, from 1945 to 1954, demonstrated what a 
determined populac e can achiev e wi th basic weaponry in 
throwing off unwanted and overwhelming ex te rnal military 
force. It surely is obvious that Ameri ca has been 
adequately generous with both countries. 
American national interest can be most easily per-
ceived if one views the prospect of either of these 
nation's internal subversion or externa l attack . There 
can be little doubt that if their governments were 
brought down it wo~ld be a strong indication that they 
lacked the wholehearted s upport an d dedication of their 
people. Is it in America ' s national interest to prop up 
governments which lack popu l ar support, simply because 
they are "anti-communist"? We answered that question 
affirmatively for t e n years in Vietna m. That our answer 
was the wrong one is one of the most unchallengeable 
l essons we have learned from the devastating Indochina 
experience. We must apply this hard-won knowle dge to 






are continuing to operate on the d~bious notion that any 
noncommunist government is good and any communist govern-
ment is bad. 
The national interest of America, in the long term, 
will be better served by our not supporting those govern-
ments which, for whatever reason, are unable to retain 
a willing, patriotic participation by their citizenry. 
That same citizenry will eventually turn to a more ac-
ceptable government, and it can safely be assumed that 
their attitude toward the nation (America) that propped 
up their oppressors will be less than favorable, In sum, 
regional self-sufficiency in South Korea and Taiwan is a 
passe argument for arms sales by America. If their 
pI:esent goirernments succeed, we can take pride in our 
contribution. If they fail, we can be spa.red the op-
probrium of having, as in South Vietnam, carried a 
government long beyond the needs or wishes of its 
citizenry. 
ISRAEL: But why not, one asks, approve arms sales 
to Israel? Surely, Israel is a government which is sup-
ported by its people and steeped in the liberal Western 
tradition. Our policies toward Israel, like those toward 
South Korea and Taiwan, are beginning to reflect their 
probable future trend, Congress has approved the Foreign 
Military Assistance package for Israel and, in a time of 
prospective termination of military assistance/grant-aid, 
has waived Israeli payment on 50% of the approved credit 
sale. This procedure, viewed aska.nce by certain Con-
gressmen, does reflect a genuine feeling of moral/ 
natior.al interest, kinship a.nd responsibility. It is 
not free from the confusing taint of "profit" or indus-
trial motivation, but it does provide a beacon for less 
complex future considerations of when the natior.al in-
terest will best be served by arms transfers. If the 
American Congress, in a time of fiscal constraint, feels 
strongly enough about an arms transfer s e rving the 
national interest to paL_for the transfer, we ca.n ir..ore 
safely assume that extrane-OUE private and industrial 
interests are not the primary motivators behind the 
transfer. Does regional self-sufficiency serve as an 
acceptable justification for pro viding arms to Israel? 
For sale - no. By gift for self-defense - yes. But 
then, one asks, wriy rict sell the arms? The answer lies 
in the forthright legitimacy of the closely-structured 
grant-aid concept. If our interest is genuinely 
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involved with Israeli svrvival, then we must act upon 
the plai n knowledge that Israel's economy is strained 
to the limit by her existing defense requirements. The 
money she pays for our weapons can more productively be 
spent on other actio~s to strengthen both her military 
forces and her international and domestic economi c 
posture. Selling arms to Israel in fact can be seen to 
contravene the United States' best interests. 
INTERNAL SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Internal Security argument has served for a good 
n~mber of years as a justification for prov i ding arms to 
dictatorships and various repressive leaders in the nam~ 
of preventing the spread of corr~unism. Congress has now 
mandated an end to military aid to regimes that demon-
strate consistent gross violations of human rights. The 
evolving application of this rule suggests an increasing 
stringency of application for the future. Early in the 
Carter administration, Secretary Vance told a Senate com-
mittee that the administration had decided to reduce 
foreign a i d to Argentina, Uruguay, and Ethiopia. 
This was the first time in memory that any 
administration had publicly announced a re-
duction in foreign aid because of human 
rights considerations. Vance said the issue 
of balancing foreign assistance with human 
rights considerations was "a very difficult 
task." He said it had to be carried out on 
a country-by-country basis. The United 
States, he said, runs the risk of appearing 
hypocritical in cutting aid to one friendly 
nation and maintaining it with another even 
though both nations might be equal violator~ 
of internationally recognized human rights. 
By March 17, 1977, five Latin American countries, 
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Guatemala ., and El Salvador, 
incensed at the U.S. Department of State investigation 
of how indigenous political prisor.ers are treated and 
other human rights matters for all countries receiving 
U.S. aid, had anr.ounced rejection of further U.S. aid. 
Brazil had earlier given "a one-year notice for ending 
its 25 year-old aid agreement with the United States, 
saying the human rights report represented an intol-
erable interference in its internal affairs."9 "The 
five countries refused to accept a total of nearly 






publication of the department's human rights survey. 11 10 
In summary, concern for human rights, as a motivator 
of arms transfers (to prevent communist expansion,) has 
been transformed into a deterrent to arms aid/foreign 
military assistance to noncommunist countries which vio-
late human rights. In a major speech to the United Nations, 
President Carter acknowledged that: 
The United States has become one of the major 
arms suppliers of the world. Carter also 
pledged initiatives to reduce the spread of 
conventional arms throughout the world, and 
said he will press for agreements among pro-
ducer and consumer nations on that issue.11 
His comments, coupled with the foregoing constraints on 
aid and foreign military assistance, carry strong im-
plications for the weight which human rights considera-
tions can be expected to carry for future arms sales. 
Concern for human rights, once actively incorporated 
into American foreign policy, will not easily be over-
ridden by defense industrialists seeking continued 
profits. Iran's turn to endure the human rights spot-
light will provide a crucial test of Carter's determina-
tion. As Charles W. Yost succinctly said in an article 
on human and sovereign rights, "Violations are violations 
wherever they occur, 11 12 
ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDUSTRIALIZED STATES 
Mr. Gelb makes the point that "the policy toward NATO 
allies and Japan is and should be virtually open-ended, 
the need is for standardization of arms and equipment .•. 
The $2 billion sale of F-16s to four NATO countries pro-
vides a ggod model {emphasis added) to go further. 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway will pro-
duce 40 per cent of the 348 F-16s they have ordered for 
themselves, plus 10 per cent of the 650 ordered by the 
United States Air Force, and 15 per cent of all F-16s 
made for export . At the same time, however, each com-
ponent produced in the four will also be made in the 
United States. 1113 
Herein lies a concept which, with forward planning 
and intra-alliance agreement, could meet economically 
both the critical need for standardization and more 
directly contribute to regional self-sufficiency, 
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industrial independence, and economic stimulation of 
each participating country. The multinational research 
and development of competing designs is not only econo-
mically wasteful, but also it generates intro-alliance 
divisiveness and over-reaching. As was the case with the 
Main Battle Tank, the procedure offers strong temptations 
for each nation to opt for its own design, with a re-
sulting failure of standardization and total lack of 
economic efficiency. 
American leadership could far better be manifested 
by the harnessing of R&D technology in the design stage, 
with proration of R&D costs and pre-planned co-production/ 
licensing agreements to encourage local production. The 
purpose of weapons and new weapons systems within an 
alliance is the projection of an affordable maximum of 
military force. To treat weapons as mere objects in an 
international competition for national economic advantage 
defeats the alliance's best interest. America's economic 
gain will be France or Germany's economic loss, and to 
that extent the alliance is weakened. 
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER 
This justification pertains to the poter.tial impact 
of an arms sale upon the Soviet-American world balance. 
Mr. Gelb notes that most sales do not fit into this 
category, and selects proposed sales to Yugoslavia and 
the PRC as prime examples while looking askance at any 
long term benefit from sales to Kenya and Zaire. In the 
latter cases he observes "these arms sales would only have 
the effect of putting the United States in a position of 
having to make decisions about the future of
4
these coun-
tries that it did not have to make before. 111 Four months 
after Mr. Gelb wrote his prophetic warning, one opens 
the newspaper to read: 
Zaire Seeking More Military Aid From U.S. The 
Carter administration faces a tough foreign 
policy decision in dealing with a new request 
from Zaire for military aid, including am-
munition from U.S.-made weapons supplied to 
the African country in years past ... the 
Carter administration is reluctant to meet 
Zaire's military needs and is lookinf
5
for 
another way to provide the material. 
David Broder, after having reviewed the arguments 






coillffiented in an article on the Risks of an African 
Crusade: 
That's the argument--as appealing now in 
Southern Africa as it was 16 years ago in 
Indochina. And once again, it rests on a 
fateful assumption--so easy for officials 
of a new administration to accept, It is 
that America can manage the world better 
than any other nation, and that the admin-
istration now in power can achieve what 
its predecessor did not even dare attempt. 
It was that same fatal hubris--the sin of 
pride which David Halberstam described in 
The Best and the Brightest-- . , .. One has 
the sense of having lived through this 
before, and of paying in blood and treasure 
and political bitterness for that misdir-
ected, moralistic urge to igtermine the 
future of the whole globe. 
It seems anorr.alous that one need even discuss why 
arms sales to the PRC or Yugoslavia contravene the long 
term American national interest. Playing some Machia-
vellian arms game with either country with a goal of 
enhancing our relative position vis-a-vis Moscow is a 
gambit fraught with surprises. Mr. Gelb noted adminis-
tration vacillation on sale of two Cyber 172 computers 
to Peking. Such vacillation is indicative of how unclear 
0¥~ goals were and how uncertain of fulfillment. No long 
term gain is likely to accrue from such uncertainty. 
Edm~nd Taylor notes that, "The classic excuse of the mer-
chant of his own countrymen's death is the one Krupp 
gave the kaiser: How could he know that today's 
friendly customer would be tomorrow's enemy?" 17 How much 
more obvious it should be that today's ideological op-
ponent is a prime candidate to be tomorrow's opponent as 
well. The logic is so plain that one need not even 
mention the illogic of denying arms to repressive non-
communist governments and selling them to repressive 
communist governments. That the issue must be addressed 
at all highlights the lengths to which we have gone to 
justify arms sales. 
REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 
· The Regional Balance of Power argument has seer. in-
creasing popularity in justifying sales to the oil-rich 
countries. Mr. Gelb makes the point that the real 
• l 
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justification for these sales is access to resources -
oil, in particular. He turns then to criticize the 
"de facto treaty" aspect of the sales, based upon the 
continuing need for a sizeable continger.t of American 
civilian contractors in-country to maintain hyper-
sophisticated military equipment, and posits the Shah's 
holding the contractors as hostages to insure American 
support for whatever policy position he might decide to 
adopt. 
Paul Erdman, in The Crash of '79, 18 has adopted an 
even less charitable view of the Shah's power potential 
and possible goals . Mr. Gelb also notes the hazard in-
herent in the oil-rich nations' use of their enormous 
weapons acquisitions as a storehouse for massive trans-
fers to ether states - which might ther~ employ therr. 
aga.inst Israel. The Regier.al Balance of Power rationale 
also is vulnerable to the same telling argument which 
David Broder raised concerning the strategic power 
balance in southern Africa, with the added moral com-
plication addressed earlier with regard to Israel, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. 
Each of these cases req~ires individual analysis, 
but, as a general rule, it would appear that our long-
term interests would be better served by what Ambassador 
Moynihan called a .,benign neglect" of many regional con-
flict situations. Change is inevitable, and pitting 
American strength against all the forces of change 
throughout the world is both vain and beyond our military 
capabilities. 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Mr. Gelb accurately notes that the notion of .,arming 
to parley" is honored most often in the breach, and poi~ts 
out the two recent examples of Turkey, in which a cut-oif 
of American arms did not induce the desired policy re-
sult, and Israel, where massive arrr.s transfers did con-
tribute to a lessening of tension. 
If the argu rrent th~t we can red uce or e liminate con~ 
flicts by providing arms to one or both of the contende~s 
is to stand, we must believe that the newly-supplied arnis 
will not be used in a future conflict of equal or greateF 
intensity. In other words, the resolution achieved must 
be a long term one. The history of the Arab-Israeli con~ 
frontation does not suggest a promising prospect for peaoe 
in the long term, and yet it is used by Mr. Gelb and others 






belligerent nations. Once again, we can observe at work 
the American vanity that we have an historical a.nd n:oral 
responsibility to manage the world's affairs. 
Suppose, for example, that we had allowed the 
Israelis to wrap up their Sinai compaign against the 
Egyptian Army. Would future conflict have been any more 
likely? Would Russia have blinked or would she have 
carried out the threatened intervention? The point is 
that we. do not have answers to those questions r:.cw, nor 
did we at the time o~ our earlier decisions. Furtherrrore, 
we did not have any assurances that providing arms would 
induce a more amicable settlement. Despite the uncer-
tainties, we took a positive action to usurp Israeli pre-
rogatives. For once, since the Second World War, we find 
ourselves with a client state capable of defending its 
own interests, supported by its populace, concerned with 
human rights, and we. treat the client as if we know more 
about how its external threat can be reduced than does the 
client! 
Our ingrained bias in favor or "keeping our options 
open" once again results in ad hoc decisions with minimal 
concern for the longer view. In the case of the Egyptian 
arms sales, we can expect, should history repeat itself, 
that in the next Middle East War we will be forced to 
choose b~tween rearming and resupplying Israel or Egypt, 
Israel will undo~btedly be to some degree disadvantaged 
by the arms which we supplied to Eg:ypt, and Egypt wi.11 
have been able to renew combat sooner because America 
forced an earlier termination of the Yorn KipJ.lUr War. To 
put it more succinctly: Our arms sales to Egypt provide 
a logical stimulus for a repetition of an historically 
recurring conflict; they help pern ,i t earlier rejoining of 
conflict, they disadvantage our client, and they set up a 
situation in which we quite probably will be required to 
offend the nHw client we had hop ed to influence positively, 
BASE AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 
This consideration as a justification for arms sales 
offers a classic illustration of how changing world cir-
cumstances invalidate "accepted" rationales, yet the 
"reasons" persist through cor~vention and administrative 
bureaucratic momentum. Mr. Gelb's criticism goes to the 
heart of the change: "The princip al base-rights countries 
now place so many restrictions on American tJ.se that the 
whole policy of 'bases for aid' requires review. 1119 For 
example, Greece, Turkey, and Spain have denied our air-
craft the use of bases in their cour-tries in Middle East 
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contingencies. Thus, we have base and transit rights 
except in cases of ger.uine military need. In exchange 
for this "privilege" we have been allowed to enhance 
their military strength and potential for independent 
action. 
President Marcos, with characteristic lack of 
restraint, has now driven the base-rights issue out into 
the open. He wants $1 billion in grants and credit arms 
sa.les which he will employ against internal dissidents 
in return for our continued use of Subic Bay and Clark 
Air Base. Marcos is taking the p1.,blic position that it 
is disadvantageous to the Philippines to be protected 
by America because Philippine soil could once again be-
come vulnerable to attack. Therefore, the Philippine 
government is justified in extorting the maximum possible 
quid pro quo from the United States. The Philippine 
position is sc blatantly obvio us that Ambassador 
Francis T. Underhill, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia 
and form~r political counselor at the U.S. Embassy in 
Manila, has produced a classified report urging closing 
of the two U.S. bases in the Philippines. 
Among other things, the report argues that: 
---Southeast Asia hasn't any longer any 
critical military and political importance 
to the U.S., despite the U.S. economic 
presence in the region. 
---Countries belonging to the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations aren't willing 
to support the American military commit-
ment in the Philippines. 
---The bases are at best of limited utility 
because in many cases they couldn't be effec-
tively used without the approval of the 
Philippine government and the U.S. Congress. 
---The effort and cost associated with 
maintaining the bases aren't necessarily 
corr.mensurate with their potential military 
benefits. 
---The presence of the bases has caused 
problems for the Philippines in dealing 
with Third World nations and with its 
Communist neighbors and are (sic) a source 






---The bases aren't necessarily an effective 
deterrent to Soviet and Chinese moves in 
the region.20 
The counterarguments, which conveniently overlook 
the Ccngression2.lly mandated concern for human rights, 
are that the loss of the bases will cost the U,S. much 
mere than it is currently spending to maintain its 
m~li tary posture in Asia, and the resv.l tant dilution 
of American Pacific strength will create apprehensions 
about Russian expansion in both Japa.n and. China. The 
counterarguments are true as far as they go, but they 
fail to address the basic issue of whether we are 
getting what we need - military bases which are use-
able in times of pclitico-military crisis - in exchange 
for the price we are paying . 
. A corollary to the evolution of the world situa-
tion with regard to base-rights is that we are 
eventually going to be required to operate from 
American soil in the projection of our military force. 
T.h.e question should be whether we will begin now to 
develop the needed new airlift and naval capabilities 
or whether we will continue to arm the world and defer 
facing the upcoming realities of the 21st century. 
GENER.AL POLITICAL lNFLtENCE 
The thrust of this a.rgurr:ent is obvious in its title, 
and it has long been considered to be a bedrock partner 
of the notion that "trad e is good unless .• ," Only 
recently has it become apparent that the increased 
availability of suppliers on both sides of the ideo-
logical curtain provide recipients with options which 
effectively limit the influence which the supplier 
gains over a recipient. Mr. Gelb's placement of this 
consideration as last among the nine is suggestive. 
As noted above, Turkey has made it very clear to the 
U.S . that she will not trade her foreign policy 
sovereignty for U.S. arms. Reversing the ideological 
coin, Egypt's pressing perceived need for arms has not 
been allowed to bind her irrevocably to the Soviet 
Union. In Latin America we are now seeing nations re-
ject even rr.ilitary assistance when the price tag has 
included 2. U.S. privilege of overseeing human rights' 
issues within the recipient nation, 
The very notion of "political influence" is a 
highly subjective and eph emer al concept. Secretary 
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Kissinger spoke of its "intangible quality. 0 21 Proof 
of influence lies in action and, as in Turkey's case, 
achievement of the s upplier's political goals once or 
twice is no assurance of lo~.g term success. SIPRI 
notes the transition away from hegenonic motivation 
for arms transfers a.nd the growing ascendancy of in-• 
dustrial motivation. 22 Similarly, there is declining 
concern from the receiver's standpoint about politicat 
obligations and an increasing focus upon maintaining 
both indepependence of action and a continuing logistic 
support from the supflier. This latter consideration 
is mcst popt:.larly offered as proof that the Shah of 
Iran can be trusted with the vast arsenal which 
America is selling to him. 
Rarely does one read an analysis of that argum~nt 
which is skeptical, despite the recent evidence to the 
contrary provided by the Turkish and Egyptian experi-
ences. Both were basic, straightfoward actions by 
independent, sovereign governments which contravened 
the desire of the supplier despite logistic tail lever-
age. Iran also has that same capability (greater 
logistic dependence nctwithstanding), and Iran also 
possesses forrr .idable economic weapons which can be 
employed in threat or retaliation to minimize the 
probability of a weapons embargo by America. 
Paul Erdman's economic scenario in The Crash of 
~ requires very little modification to make it 
startlingly clear that an America faced by an oil 
embargo, withdrawal of short term petrodollar deposits, 
a massive Iranian "sell" order on Wall Street, the 
prospective loss of a huge industrial market, and the 
loss of a supJ.•OEedly moderate oil supplying ally, 
would be hard-pressed to shut off the Iranian logistic 
tail with the sam6 confident nonchalance we exhibited 
in Israel and Turkey, If we in fact had the courage 
of our convictions t oday, we would easily find human 
rights reasons for hal t ing al l sales to Iran. That 
we have not illustrates unmistakably our growing 
industrial vice political motivation and the incon-
sistency of our arms sales policies when confronted 
by domestic political pressures to go forward with 
large arms sales. 
If we can not anticipate a long term political 
influence over Iranian policies, then one may as well 
acknowledge that "general political influence" is not 
the real basis for the sa l es. It is rather a time-






convenient because it is believed to be self-evident, 
and one which is irrelevant to the central dynamics of 
profit and keeping open factory lines. 
OTHER FACTORS 
Mr. Gelb's nine factors are most revealing for their 
omission of the industrial or profit motive as a major 
consideration motivating arms sales. Even Secretary 
Kissinger, justifying the International Security Assis-
tance Act of 1976 to the Congress, paid scant obeisance 
to this factor, saying only, in comparison with five 
closely-printed pages of testimony devoted to the other 
nin~ rationales: 
And there are gains to our domestic 
position as well. Security assistance 
programs contribute needed jobs to 
several sectors of our labor force. 
They help us to maintain a more favor-
able balance of payments. And they per-
mit our defense industries to achieve 
significant economies through scale of 
production - economies that are passed 
alor..g through lower prices to our 
armed forces.2.3 
Content analysis would lead one to believe that the 
domestic economic factor was a minor one. However, given 
a level of arms sales prospectively reaching $10 billion 
ann~ally, one cannot but wonder why the Secretary gave 
it so little mention. The explanation is to be found 
in our reluctance to face publicly the seamier side of 
the arms business. When we sell arms we want to be-
lieve that it serves the cause of justice, democracy, 
human rights, and world peace - all perfectly prop~r 
American foreign policy goals, Such arguments had more 
merit when we were giving arms away, but as that trans-
fer mode became burdensome economically and sales re-
placed gifts, we contim ... ed to assuage our puritan 
conscience with the notion that arms sales were the 
lineal descendants of earlier foreign policy antecedents. 
· · In other words, we did not look to see if the 
rationale was still valid because we were afraid of 
what we would find. We knew, somehow, that although 
the simplistic notions of the 1930s - that arms sales 
caused wars - were in fact simplistic, nonetheless we 
also knew that arms export for profit was not in the 
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best American tradition. If our national security 
interests genuinely depended upon providing arms to 
the world, we wo~ld have continued grant aid! We did 
not, and thereby hangs the tale, 
In order to make any reliable judgment on the 
efficacy of arms sale as a foreign policy tool we must 
consider the long term effects of the sales upon the 
people of the recipient nations. Arms purchased to 
suppress dissidents seeking to overthrow repressive 
regimes may temporarily delay a liberating change in 
the status quo, but our best interest lies in adopting 
policies which reflect the highest principles of 
American concern for freedom and justice. Such policies 
will stand the test of time and will align us with those 
forces within the developing nations which most nearly 
represent the American ideal. In our intense pursuit 
of ad hoc stability in the world we have allowed the 
communist nations to usurp the role of people's 
liberator in the Third World. 
As these new nations join the industrialized and 
educated community of nations there will be violent 
changes in governments, and emerging new elites will 
demand liberating concessions from tired and reluctany 
regimes. America's roles should be to provide an 
example for peaceful change, to exert pressures on 
behalf of peaceful, liberating change, and to side 
publicly though not militarily with the emerging 
forces. John K. Fairbank described the problem, the 
solution, and the pclicy as early as 1949, It is not 
too late for us to learn the lesson • 
. • . our problem is to ally ourselves with 
the forces of the fut ure in Asia, which I 
think we can do. The peasant, for in-
stance, is there to be organized, revolu-
tion is there to be led, and our problem 
is to relate ourselves to these movements
24 in Asia - not to try to do the job alone. 
America t with its abundant resources and unparalleleq 
"advertising 0 abilities should enter the lists with cop-, 
vincing policies and arguments of how and why the 
American way to modernization is superior to Marx•s 
prescription. 
We have already seen how American arms sales to au~ 







through the denigration of indigenous development and 
encouragement of regional paranoia. We have noted the 
absurdly long period in which America has sustained the 
regimes in South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. We 
have observed the fallacy of meddling in regional con-
flicts to preserve an uncertain status quo. But what of 
our economic interests? To halt all arms sales would 
be to impact adversely our currency flow and balance of 
payments, our defense industrial capacity, our own 
d~fense costs, and our ability to recoup petrodollar 
surpluses. These are weighty considerations, but they 
are not insuperable providing we act now to avoid the 
economic dependency upon arms sales which characterizes 
both Britain and France. 
Although (arms) exports are not the only 
methods of filling surplus capacity, for 
most European countries they represent the 
preferred alternative. For the United 
States and the Soviet Union, exports are 
too small in relation to total defense 
pI'oduction to fill surplus capacity. But 
these nations can afford expensive alter-
natives. They can afford to increase 
their defense spending . They can also 
devote sufficient research and develop-
ment (R&D) resources and order weapons 
in sufficient numbers to reduce the 
generation gap. They can also afford to 
employ surplus capacity on prestige 
projects such as a space program.25 
In the absence of arms profits, American industry 
can turn to production and aggressive marketing of those 
g9Qds and services most needed by developing co~tries. 
Our defense industrial capacity is presently oversized 
a~d m~st be reduced in any eventuality. The bailouts 
of Lockheed and Grumman have set the clock run~ing for 
an inevitable scaling down of our capacity. Congressional 
lack of concern for Grumman laid down the challenge, and 
it was only Iran's purchase of the F-14 which deferred 
th .~ day of reckoning. 
The most significant long term danger confronting 
the United States is the accumulation of petrodollar 
surpluses in foreign hands, Much has been made of this 
argument to encourage approval of arms sales to the 
Mtd~East. And ret, it should be apparent that the 
annual sale of $10 billion in arms as opposed to a 
$40 billion annual petroleum purchase is but a very 
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partial holding action. The solution lies not in 
militarily arming a potential adversary who is yearly 
acquiring an ever-greater economic stranglehold on 
America, but in reducing our oil imports. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following policy recommendations clearly repre~ 
sent radical departures from past American arms transfer 
policies as well as present attitudes toward eliminatio~ 
of grant-aid. However, they are offered not as marvelqus 
new panaceas, but as pre-existent ideas whose time has~ 
if not arrived, at least moved considerably closer with 
the advent of petrodollars and human rights emphasis. 
Implementing these recomrr~ndations without creating 
antagonism or repercussions such as the "Nixon shocks" 
to Japan will require Jovian tact and timing. On the 
other hand, it is in the long term national interest to 
move in the proposed new directions, sooner rather tha~ 
later, and to make America synonymous as it once was wit~ 
the cause of freedom and the idea of internationally 
responsible, effective national power, 
l, America should unilaterally terminate all fu~u~~ 
sales of arms. 
a . The policy should be applied across the 
board wit h absolute impartiality. 
b. The pol i cy should be explained to the 
world as an American initiative to avoid 
further complicity in warfare among nations, 
c. The policy should be coupled with an aggres~ 
sive s a les effort comparing proposed non-
military technological and economic benefits 
which can be achieved at earlier arms sale 
expenditure levels. 
d. Other arms supplievs shoul d be encourageq 
to redirect their profit-making and foreign 
exchange acquisition efforts away from 
military sales . 
2 . All future transfers of American arms should be 
on a strict grant-aid basis with full case-by-
case Congressi onal scrutiny to insure the tran~~ 
fer accomplishes tangible , long term goals of 









a. Such grant-aid transfers shot..1.d be re-
stricted to efforts to resist external 
aggression. 
b, Such grant-aid should be allowed only to 
governments which show a positive con-
cern for human rights and enjoy the 
support of the countries' peoples. 
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When we use resources (people and things) to accom-
plish a purpose, we want to be sure we are using them in 
such as way as to get the most for our money. To achieve 
this objective we need to know - at least approximately -
how costs would be affected by using alternative combina-
tion of resources and how costs would be affected by 
changes in assigned levels of output, either at a single 
facility or among a group of facilities with different 
operating levels,l 
The above concise statement summarizes the essence 
of Economic Analysis, whether it be in industry or within 
the Department of Defense. Basically, economic analysis 
involves the determination of the cost, versus benefit, 
of each future course of action, In industry, cost col-
lection and output measurements are easily quantifiable 
and are taken for granted. The problem in government is 
often much more complex. Many times the costs can be 
calculated accurately; however, th e measurement of the 
output is usually in terms of social benefits, a factor 
most often impossible to quantify, Although a weak, 
ineffective Navy may have long-term economic implications 
for the United States, the actual value of a strong Navy 
depends on what each individual citizen perceives it to 
be. Even among our Congressmen, there is strong dis-
agreement over the value of a strong deterrent force. 
In spite of these difficulties, the military manager 
must be able to combine sound economic analysis with the 
intangible benefits to come up with a proposal that will 
"sell," Selling a proposal is becoming increasingly 
difficult, History has shown that when the nation is 
under direct threat of military aggression, by a com-
monly perceived enemy, the military has been able to 
extract large quantities of resources from the private 
sector. In today's world of detente, the average United 
States citizen perceives no real, immediate threat to 
his security. He therefore has adjusted his priorities 
toward increased social benefits, i.e., quality of life. 
Military preparedness programs are being viewed now 
more than ever before as an integral part of the broader 
concept of national security. As a result, the expected 
benefits for specific military programs are being com-
pared with the expected benefits from non-military 
programs for purposes of making resource allocations. 2 
It is in this arena that the military manager must 
operate. Unlike his civilian counterpart, whose goal 
may be clearly defined as profit maximization, the 
military manager is faced with maximization of bene-
fits for a given cost, or the achievement of a given 
performance objective at a minimum cost. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS/PROGRAM EVALUATION 
WITHIN THE DEPARTlVIENT OF DEFENSE 
Economic analysis within the Department of Defense 
gets its impetus from DOD INST 7041.J dated 18 October 
1972. This instruction spells out the basic guidelines 
that military departments and defense agencies are to 
follow in their resource management programs. Two key 
concepts are delineated in this instruction: (1) 
Economi c Analysis and (2) Program Evaluation, 
Economic analysis is formally defined by DOD as: 
A systematic approach to the problem of 
choosing how to employ scarce resources 
and an inv est i gation of the full impli-
cations of achieving a given objective 
in the most e fficient and effective 
manner.3 
The key phrase in this definition is, ", .. achieving a 
given objective in the most efficient and effective 
manner." Efficiency and effectiveness are not neces-
sarily by-products of each other . In other words, 
being efficient does not necessarily mean that we are 
effective nor does the reverse hold true. It is quite 
easy to understand the concept of being effective (that 
is, accomplishing the states mission) but doing it 
inefficiently. 
However, it is not readily apparent that you can 
just as easily be efficient but not effective. This 
aspect is an insidious nature. People become so in-
volved with their little world that they forget the big 
picture. The real danger for the military manager is 
losing sight of the overall goals of "National Defense" 
and engaging in empire building. Dr. Ulrey writes: 
Traditionally, managers of government 
activities have, ... relied heavily on 
records of expenditures allocated to 
accomplish some specific objective, not 







To ensure that both efficiency and effectiveness are 
accomplished in Department of Defens e programs, the 
following guidelines apply: 
A. Systematically identify the benefits, other 
outputs and costs associated with alternative 
programs, missions, and functions and/or of 
alternate ways f or accomplishing a given 
program. 
B. Highlight the sensitivity of a decision to 
the values of the key variables and assump-
tions on which decisions are based including 
technical, operational, schedule or other 
performance considerations. 
C. Evaluate alternative methods of financing 
investments, such as lease or buy. 
D. Use benefits and costs to compare the rela-
tive merits of alternatives as an aid in: 
1. making trade-offs between alternatives; 
2. recommending the cost-effective alter-
native; and 
3, establishing or changing priorities. 
Program evaluation is defined by DOD as: 
Economic analysis of ongoing actions to 
determine how best to improve an approved 
program/project based on actual perfor-
mance. Program evaluation studies entail 
a comparison of actual performance with 
with approved program/project.5 
In essence, program evaluation should tell us how effec-
tive and how efficient a current program is operating. 
The difference in the two concepts discussed above 
can be easily seen when classified according to purpose. 
Economic analysis can be thought to assist a manager in 
identifying the best new programs/projects to be 
adopted. Program evaluation focuses on approved pro-
grams and projects to insure that established goals and 
objectives are being attained in the most cost-
effective manner. Or even more simply put, economic 
analysis could be referred to as pre-expenditure . 
analysis with program evaluation called post-expenditure 
analysis. 
It is the Department of Defense's stated policy 
that economic analysis must be used on all projects 
whenever a trade-off between two or more options exists. 
This includes the status quo when that is one of the 
available options. With regard to periodic program 
evaluation, a Presidential Memorandumb stipulated that 
it will be accomplished, on a high priority basis, in 
every current program - large and small - to uncover 
those programs which can and should be modified or 
eliminated. 
By directing that economic analysis and program 
evaluation be conducted, the Department of Defense did 
not intend that reports are to be automatically sub-
mitted along with proposed projects. But rather, 
analysis is to be used in arriving at the best proposal, 
and then insure that the information is available, 
should the need for in-depth information arise. 
A very important aspect of DOD INST 7041.J is the 
fact that a program or project justified on the basis 
of military necessity is not exempt from the requirement 
to perform economic analysis or program evaluation. This 
serves two purposes. First, it prevents by-passing the 
intent of the instr uction through classifying questionable 
projects as military necessity. Second, it should force 
the military manager to examine all aspects of his ob-
jective. Perhaps the B-1 bomber isn't the most effec-
tive and efficient solution to that specific problem, 
but the above req uirement at least r equires that 
alternatives be examined. 
As indicated in the above paragraphs, DOD INST 
7041.3 is very explicit in establishing requirements 
for economic analysis and program evaluation. This is 
not to say that analysis will be done for analysis sake, 
but rather military managers should heed the axiom -
analysis should not be conducted when its costs exceed 
the benefits. 
One of the premises of economic analyses/program 
evaluation within DOD is that it is to be accomplished 
at all levels (including operational), using available 
talent. However, it was realized that implementation of 
these concepts requires a level of sophistication in 
analytical techniques that is not commonly available 
throughout the military structure. Avoiding the estab-
lishment of a new, larger bureaucracy, the Defense 
Economic Analysis Council (DEAC) was created. The 






military departments, defense agencies, and Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Given a charter to 
encourage application of analysis techniques and 
strengthen analytical capabilities throughout the 
Department, they accomplish their objective through 
the following areas, 
A. Establish policies and procedures for the 
utilization of analyses techniques. 
B. Assist in the application of economic 
analysis/programs evaluation in the 
planning, programming, budgeting process 
and also in other decision-making pro-
cesses within the Department of Defense. 
C. Provide advice as to techniques and 
methodology for justifying and supporting 
resource consumption decisions. 
D. Establish educational programs to facili-
tate the use of economic analysis/program 
evaluation at all levels within the 
Department of Defense. 
E. Improve the quality and strengthen the 
analytical capabilities of the Department 
of Defense. 
In 1974, DEAC reported that analysis is being used 
on major projects but that the thousands of managers at 
the o~erational level were not utilizing this valuable 
tool., This was exactly opposite of what then Secretary 
of Defense Schlesinger envisioned economic analysis 
could accomplish. In a May 9, 1973 memorandum he 
stated: 
I expect to see our thousands of managers 
who collectively make tens of thousands 
of daily decisions on consumption of 
resources, concern themselves with the 
outputs and benefits derived from each 
decision made. 
This seemingly creates a dilemma at the operating level. 
The manager is encouraged to use techniques that appear 
to be beyond his grasp. Colonel Edmund W. Edmonds, Jr,, 
former DEAC Chairman, stated thats 
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Most of the tools and techniques comprising 
and supporting Economic Analysis are 
relatively simple - they are not sophisti-
cated, esoteric, or far-out - and they can 
be used by people with general as 9pposed 
to technical backgrounds and experience.8 
To dispel the exotic mystique of analysis, DEAC has estab-
lished training programs aimed at the operator. One 
product that is readily available is the Department of 
Defense Economic Analysis Handbook. This document pro-
vides a step-by-step process that the uninitiated can 
easily follow, Section IV of this paper will summarize 
the contents of this handbook. For managers who have 
absolutely no analysis background, an excellent supple-
ment to this handbook is a book written by Dr . Ivon W. 
Ulrey and Dr . Ann P. Ul rey, ent:.. tl e-d "Analysis for 
Managers of People and Things.~ This book was developBd 
for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
specif i cally to assist the military manager in decision 
making. It is by necessity an elementary approach, 
written in layman's terms. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS/PROGRAM EVALUATION 
WITHIN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 
The economic analysis/program evaluation program 
within the Navy is contained in SECNAVINST 7000.14 Series 
and OPNAVINST 7000 . 18 series. Quite naturally these in-
structions merely add a few specifics, and responsibility 
assignments, to the basic DODINST 7041.3 discussed in 
Section II. OPNAVINST 7000.18 re-emphasizes th at economic 
analysis will be used as an integral part of the Navy 
programming pr ocess, including the overall preparation 
of the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM); in support 
of budget justification for selected items and as part 
of the acquisition for of major weapons via the process 
used in preparing the Development Concept Papers (DCP) 
and preparing justification for Defense System Acquisition 
Review Council (DSARC) reviews. 
, Primary responsibility for implementation of the 
economic analysis program has been assigned to the Chief 
of Naval Material and the Director, Navy Program Planning 
(OP-090) . In particular, (OP-92) is responsible for im-
plementation of the program as it pertains to the annual 
budget justification. The Systems Analysis Division 
(OP-96) is responsible for the program as it pertains to 
the major weapons systems. This includes analyses 







As previously quoted in Section II, DOD formally 
defines economic analysis as, "A systematic approach ... " 
It is readily apparent that analysis of any type, to be 
successful, must be approached systematically. Hope-
fully, this systematic approach will accomplish the 
following: 
A. Focus informal thinking. 
B. Surface hidden assumptions. 
C. Effectively communicate the basic rationale 
behind the proposal. 
The eight elements of the process, as defined by DOD, 
are depicted in flowchart format in Appendix I, and are 
summarized below: 
A. DEFINE OBJECTIVES - The first and most important 
step is defining the objectives. The Random House 
Dictionary defines objective as, "something that one's 
efforts are intended to attain or accomplish." Therefore, 
very simply put, defining an objective is to determine 
what that "something" is. Once this determination is 
made, and put in writing, it can be used in the future 
as a standard to measure against. There are four levels 
of abstraction when describing a Command's mission 
(objectives). 
1, Basic Activity. This is normally easy to 
quantify. An example might be a Naval 
Dispensary . Its basic activity could be 
measured by number of patients seen per 
unit of time. 
2. Organizational Product. Here organizational 
product is defined as physical output. This 
form of mission description obviously can-
not apply to all Commands. An example might 
be personnel trained. Again it is a measure 
easily quantifiable when applicable . 
3, Extra-Organizational Value. This is directly 
related to Organizational Product except in 
this case the quality of the output or 
benefits received by other Commands is de-
fined. The example previously cited would 
take the form of adequacy of persons 
trained. 
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4. Social Values. Unfortunately many activi-
ties within the Department of Defense fall 
primarily in this category. It is the most 
abstract and covers the broad areas of 
national defense, law enforcement, environ-
mental control, etc. Thus it is almost 
impossible to define its limits. 
Let's look for a minute at an aircraft carrier and see how 
it fits into the above categories. It is readily apparent 
that it is easy to describe its basic activity. That 
activity can be measured by numerous indices such as num-
ber of sorties flown, days at sea, etc. But this measure-
ment of activity is at best a surrogate for determining 
accomplishment of its mission. Since a CV has no physical 
product, items A.2. and A.3. do not apply. This leaves 
Social Value. What is the social value of an aircraft 
carrier? It is impossible to measure quantitatively. 
B. CHOOSE ALTERNATIVES - The second step is to 
determine practical methods of meeting the defined objec-
tive. Some alternatives may be eliminated immediately due 
to resource constraints placed on the proposal. It is the 
responsibility of the analyst to ensure that all workable 
alternatives are studies. 
C. FORlVIULATE ASSUMPTIONS - Assumptions are necessary 
in every analysis in order to limit the scope of the study. 
An assumption is a "given° arid cannot be classified as a 
''fact." Therefore it does carry with it a certain amount 
of risk. It is very important that all assumptions be 
documented. This enhances the study since everyone will 
know the bases of the study. Two key assumptions that 
must be made concerning every project study, are economic 
life and the period of comparison, summarized as follows: 
1. Economic life is defined by accountants as the 
number of years which benefits are expected as 
a result of making the investment. Economic 
life is constrained by one of three different 
factorst 
a. Physical life is the number of years that 
the asset is physically useful. For ex-
ample, a truck has an expected physical 
life at the end of which it will theoreti-
cally stop running. 
b. Technological life is the period before the 






c. Military and political considerations -
this constraint could be compared with 
product-market life in industry. The 
classic example of this is the machine 
making buggy whips. It may physically 
last for 100 years, and there may be no 
possibility of making technological im-
provements in it, yet its economic life 
came to an end because of the loss of 
the buggy whip market. 
2. The Department of Defense has established 
maximum economic lives for various categories 
of investments. They are as follows: 
a. Automatic data processing equipment -
8 years. 
b. Buildings - 25 years. 
c. Operating equipment - 10 years. 
d. Utilities, plants and utility distribution 
systems - 25 years. 
e. Weapon/support systems - maximum economic 
life will vary by type of weapon or 
support system. 
J. The period of comparison can become quite com-
plicated when two or more alternatives have 
varying economic lives. Generally you must use 
as a base year the first year in which any one 
of the alternatives requires an expenditure. 
When establishing the length of the comparison 
you may use either the shortest or longest 
economic life. However, when you have unequal 
economic lives, care must be taken to make 
appropriate adjustments so as to avoid any 
bias. 
D, DETERMINE COSTS - Cost analysis is the most com-
plicated and perhaps the most time ·consuming step in the 
entire analysis procedure. Many of the larger projects 
are so complicated that they require the skill of pro-
fessional analysts to determine costs. But there are also 
many applications where the average military manager is 
capable of determining a reasonably accurate cost estimate , 
DODINST 7041.J contains a detailed description of cost 
estimation procedures. It is not the intent of this paper 
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to go into detail concerning the procedures, since they 
are generally similar to estimation techniques in the 
private sector, but I will point out some of the key 
guidelines prescribed as follows: 
1. Quite naturally, all costs are to be included 
in the analysis. This is meant to include all 
those so-called "free" items such as military 
manpower, existing buildings, equipment, etc. 
When feasible, and especially in research and 
development, life-cycle cost estimates (LCCE) 
will be used. These costs should be listed by 
the year in which they are expected to occur. 
2. Present value techniques are emphasized by the 
Department of Defense. A discount rate of 10% is 
prescribed for all projects to be analyzed, and 
a table of discount factors (at 10%) is provided 
in DODINST 7041.J. This table reflects an assum-
tion that cost and/or savings flow will occur 
3. 
more or less continuously rather than in a "lumpy" 
once-per-period fashion. Justification for the 
use of present value factors is stated in 
DODINST 7041,3 as follows: 
Interest will be treated as a cost which 
is related to all Government expenditures, 
r egardless of whether there are revenues 
or income by way of special taxes for a 
project to be self-supporting. This 
position is based on the premise that no 
public investment should be undertaken 
without considering the alternative use 
of the f unds which it absorbs or displaces . 
• . . One way for DOD to assure this result 
is to adopt in public investment evalua-
ti ons an interest rate which reflects 
the private sector investment opportunities 
foregone. 
This is basically the opportunity cost conc~pt 
in that it attempts to measure the oppo~tun1ty 
which is sacrificed by using resources in the 
public sector vice the private sector . 
Inflation is an important aspect of our . economy 
today and therefore will be most o~ten_important 
in the analysis of projects extending into 
futur e years. When inflation is to be con~ 






terms of constant dollars (value of dollar at 
time of decision) and then secondly in terms of 
inflated dollars. The Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) promulgates indices for 
use in escalating cost estimates. 
4. There are four areas that are specifically 
exempt from discounting and they are: 
a. Decisions concerning water resource projects. 
b. Decisions concerning the acquisition of 
commercial-type services by Government or 
contractor operation. 
c. Proposed programs/projects which if adopted 
would not extend over three years from 
inception. 
d. Program evaluation studies which deal only 
with historical costs or contain no cost 
comparisons. 
E. DETERMINE BENEFITS - As discussed in the previous 
section, cost determination can be complicated and often 
difficult. Its counterpart benefit determination is 
rarely easy and, usually, virtually impossible to quantify 
accurately. The reliability of economic analysis is 
directly proportional to the ·precision of the cost/output 
data. This does not mean that we forget about economic 
analysis when the output is difficult to measure. We 
merely apply it knowing that the results will be less 
precise. Decisions based in part on this type of infor-
mation will most often be better than those based on "gut" 
feelings. DODINST 7041.3 presents the following four-
step procedure to facilitate the measurement of output: 
1. Identify all relevant outputs. 
2. Establish data sources. Utilize existing data 
whenever possible. 
3. Collect, summarize, evaluate, validate and 
display output data. 
4. Compare output data with resources consumed. 
Even with the above steps, the task of benefit measure-
ment remains formidable. 
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F. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES - The ranking of 
alternatives is simple when they provide equal benefits 
at unequal costs. You naturally will select the lowest 
cost alternative. It be comes more difficult when you 
are faced with unequal benefits and unequal costs. In 
many cases the military manager is faced with a resource 
(money) constraint and he must maximize the benefit. 
Here the analyst must be careful to fully document the 
output of each alternative to ensure that the alternative 
selected yields the maximum benefit. If "special con-
siderations" result in the selection of alternatives that 
are not the most cost-eff ective, the reasons must be 
defensible, 
G. UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS - Almost every decision 
made involves varying degrees of risk. As a final step 
in economic analysis, the rank i ng of alternatives must 
be examined to see how changes in environment or criteria 
affect the original analysis. Included in this step is 
sensitivity analysis. By varying key uncertain parameters 
it can be determined how sensitive the ranking is to 
fluctuations. This should then give the analyst an in-
tuitive feeling for the level of confidence in his 
analysis. 
H. DECISIONS - To assume that decisions can be made 
by simply determining the priorities of various alterna-
tives would be a mistake. The process discussed up to 
this point should be regarded as an aid to the decision-
making process and nothing more, 
SUMMARY 
In this paper I have tried to point out that economic 
analysis/program eva l uation in the Department of Defense 
encounters major difficulties. Namely, benefits and 
outputs are difficult to measure. This difficulty should 
not discourage the imaginative military manager. The 
complexity of the analysis will depend directly on the 
size of the proposed project. The average manager should 
develop the skills to enable him to do simple studies. 
Complex problems will still require that the study be 
completed by a professional analyst. And finally, the 
analysis procedures discussed are not intended to make 
decisions, but rather as one of the tools used by the 
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UNITED STATES POLICY 
ON AIR HIJACKIN& 
by 
Fred Bradley, Jr. 
Air transportation is highly vulner-
able to terrorist acts. The author 
traces the history of aircraft hi-
jacking and the resultant piecemeal 
development of policies and procedures 
to counteract this threat. The study 
concludes with a close look at a re-
cent hijacking and the ineffectiveness 
of present procedures. 
This study was submitted to Lieutenant 
Connnander Robert W. Sagehorn, USN, in 
partial fulfillment of the course 
requirements for Transportation 
Management (MN JJ?J). 
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sity in 1968. He is presently a candidate for an 
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NON-DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSISTENT 
ANTI-HIJACKI NG POLICY 
The times in which the world is now living is 
characterized by terro r and is being punctuated almost 
daily by reports of acts of terror. There is no longer 
just the personal motives of th e mad bomber, as por-
trayed in the early movies, but now intertwined with 
the insanity of individual man, is the craziness of 
groups of men and women. 
The vehicles used for both pleasure and business are 
among the most susceptible to terrorist acts . Because 
of such widespread us e of vehicles, both arbitrary and 
mandatory for the existance of man, they will remain the 
targets for these acts of terror until the causes of 
terror are ultimately elim~nated . 
Until the grandios e dream of ca use elim i nation is 
achieved, we are left with the problem of reducing the 
transportation susceptibility to acts of terror. The 
importance that the role of safety takes in the national 
sphere of influence is perhaps best summed up in the 
Department of Transportation's statement: 
It is the policy of the Department of Trans-
portation to provide the highest practicable 
level of safety for people, property and the 
environment associated with or exposed to the 
nations transporta t ion system,l 
Although the realm of terrorist acts in transporta-
tion cover innumerable facets, only the specific areas of 
United States air transportation will be investigated as 
to its response to the terrorist acts involving air 
transportation. Terrorist acts for this paper will be 
defined as those acts which could or do cause either 
mental or physical damage to life and actual or possible 
physical damage to mate r ial possessions. 
Due entirely to its uniqueness, air transportation 
is totally vulnerable to either real or imaginable 
terrorist acts. An inflight air vehicle cannot just 
stop and be evacuated. It operates in an environment 
that if a motive or control problem arises, there are 
few if any safe alternatives. There are no curbs to 
drive against to slow the speed and certain vehicle area s 
are totally inaccessible for investig ation or repair 






and cargo into the same physical unit make either of 
these areas prime target locations for acts of terror. 
Aerial hijacking or the piracy of air carriers has 
been an international problem, particularily during the 
1960s, beginning with the first "Cuban" hijackings in 
1961. There were numerous, little-published incidents, 
during the early Cold War era, of the seizing or forcible 
diversion of military aircraft from one side of the Iron 
Curtain to the other, possibly with the tacit encourage-
ment o~ aid of the military intelligence units of both 
sides. In the 1960s, however, because of the very fre-
quency of repetition of the hijackings and the increased 
political intensity of these incidents coupled with the 
disregard and mistreatment of innocent civilian air-
craft passengers caught in the web of the incident, the 
act of hijacking changed from being characterized as an 
occasional romantic adventure to an event to be des-
pised.) 
In the context of the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East areas, hijacking seems to have developed merely as 
one means, among a number of available alternatives, for 
trying to achieve political objectives without recourse 
to direct military action or confrontation and the risks 
of defeat that any such military action might involve. 
The advantage of hijacking as a weapon for achieving 
major national political objectives by non-military means, 
has been the unusually small expenditure of money, energy 
and lives that such actions would normally require. 
The enormous international publicity for political 
purposes that hijacking has managed to generate and the 
perverse sympathy that these acts of piracy worked in 
many quarters stemmed no doubt from the superficial com-
parison of the physical frailty of the hijacker himself 
as compared to the accumulated power and prestige symbol-
ized by the jets or jumbo-jets that the hijacker succeeded 
in taking over. This success trend in public emotion 
was reversed with the multiple hijapkings to the 
Jordanian desert in September 1970.4 
Faced with the practical failure of international 
responses by the multilateral convention or treaty route, 
and also the relative ineffectiveness of control of any-
thing other than hijackings wholly committed within their 
own national borders, the legal means had to be laid 
aside and other alternative forms of social control 
would have to be pursued, since the social problem of 
hijacking showed no signs of abating.5 Bombing 
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incidents forced the United States and the Soviet Union 
into leading the way to international legal changes . 
However, the Middle East is one area where, even today, 
the true legal control, or want of control, is still 
lacking. 
Although overly simplistic, the problem that the 
United States found itself involved in during the early 
1960s does present a unique government or country 
position. Having to go against air piracy when it is 
now perpetuated against yourself, as compared to 
silently rooting for the ••politically oppressed' ' to 
succeed in reaching the United States, is a difficult 
task at best. The action of the United States Govern-
ment in response to acts of terror within its bound-
aries follows what appears to be direct relationship 
to the number of terrorist acts that are committed. 
In fiscal year 1967, the only FAA overt concern 
was in the area of investigating anonymous telijphone 
calls that threatened the bombing of aircraft . 6 In 
1968 the FAA reported that since 1960 a number of 
promising research and development approaches to the 
aircraft-sabotage problem had been evaluated, but that 
no economically feasible or effective solutions had 
been found. Efforts wer e also being directed during 
the year for a research and development solution to 
the aircraft hijacking problem.7 
In 1969, after seven years of almost no a i rcraft 
hijacking, air piracy erupted on an epidemic scale, 
The government's only prior experience had occurred in 
1961. Only four United States carrier aircraft had 
been hijacked during this lull, Thirteen were hijacked 
in calendar year 1968 and a total of twelve occurred 
in Ja nuary of 1969. A total of ten more air carrier 
aircraft had been successfully hijacked by the end of 
year 1969. The total as of JO J une 1969 stood at 
thirty-nine.8 
Although the air piracy acts of 1961 di d produce 
some anti-hi j acking measures, such as Public Law 
87-197 which defined a i rcraft p i racy and enumerated 
various punishments and fines for certain acts, the 
main non-paper product of the law was to allow the air 
carr i ers to refuse transp ortation to anyone, if in 
their opinion they might be dangerous to flight safety. 
Also, as a result of the 1961 hijackings, selected FAA 






the door to the flight deck or cockpit in air carriers 
would be closed and locked. These measures were 
largely frustrated in the 1968-69 hijackings by cer-
tain circumstances favoring the hijacker. When he made 
his move aboard an aircraft in flight, he had the ad-
vantage that any effort to resist him would be a gamble 
with the lives of all on board. But arresting him 
after the plane had landed was generally not possible 
either; the planes were all being hijacked to Cuba, 
where the hijacker was allowed to remain after the 
plane and its other occupants had been permitted to 
return to the United States. Of the grand total of 
thirty-nine U.S. air carrier aircraft successfully hi-
jacked by June JO, 1969, all but one had been forced to 
land in Cuba; the lone exception, shortly after takeoff 
from Honolulu on August 31, 1965, was forced to return 
to the Honolulu airport. 
In response to the alarming rate of hijackings pre-
vailing at the end of 1968 and in January 1969, the FAA 
in February 1969 created an eight-man Task Force on the 
Deterrence of Air Piracy, assembling in this group a 
broad spectrum of agency expertise under the leadership 
of the Deputy Federal Air Surgeon. Systematic study of 
the problem by the task force revealed, among other 
things, that a hijacker "profile" could be constructed 
from behavioral characteristics possessed in common by 
many of the hijackers of the past. When the task force 
combined this "profile" with a weapons-screening device 
developed by the agency, the result was a detection 
system promising usefulness in dealing with the problem 
under the purview of the agency and the airlines, i.e., 
by trying to prevent potential hijackers from boarding 
aircraft in the first place.9 
Fiscal year 1970 brought about the turning point in 
air piracy. There was a drop in incidents down to 
twenty-six. The pattern of aircraft diversion to Cuba 
was broken when five of these aircraft were forced to go 
elsewhere, Developments in anti-hijacking were high-
lighted by the selective use of the detecting system. 
Of special note is that no hijacking incident occurred 
on any flight on which this system had been applied. 
Several other events had impact upon the air piracy 
picture, these being: 
l, There was an increase in the number of arrests 
and trials of hijackers of U.S. aircraft, Forty-five 
arrests had been made since the hijacking of the first 
U.S. aircraft in 1961 including: fourteen returnees from 
65 
Cuba (all through some other country); eighteen con-
victions on various charges, with sentences ranging 
from an indefinite term in a correctional school 1·or 
certain juveniles to twenty years for four adults; 
three findings of mental incompetence to stand trial 
and three acquittals, one on grounds of temporary 
insanity; and twenty-one cases pending. 
2. An ann ouncement by Cuba (September 1969) of 
a new law that apparently would allow return of air-
craft hijackers, except those regarded as political 
refugees, to the countries from which they had fled if 
those countries would reciprocate in the case of 
persons fleeing Cuba. 
3, The U.S. ratification of the Tokyo Convention 
on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft took place September 5, 1969. Though ineffec-
tual against hijackings to non-signatory countries, the 
conventionwas a forward step in its clarifying of 
jurisdiction over crimes aboard aircraft anywhere in 
the world, 
4. An extraordinary session of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization's Assembly at Montreal, 
June 16-30, 1970, considered possible measures by 
member states to combat aircraft piracy and other 
criminal acts endangering civil air transport. The 
Federal Aviation Administrator attended as vice chair-
man of the U. S . delegation.IO 
Fis 'ca.l ;year 1971 brought in the age of organized inter-
national blac kmail with the mass air hijacking plan of 
four air carriers (including one United States carrier) 
on 6 September 1970, Four aircraft being blown up, 
resulted in the President of the United States calling 
for: first, armed U.S. Government guards on flights on 
U.S. commercial airlines; second, extending the use of 
electronic surveillance equipment and other surveillance 
techniques by American-flag carriers to all gateway 
airports and other appropriate airports in the United 
States , and in other countries wherever possible; third, 
accelerating Federal Government efforts to develop 
security measures, including new methods for detecting 
weapons and explosive devices; fourth, full consulta-
tion with foreign governments and foreign air carriers 
on anti-hijacking techniques; and fifth, a more effec-






Although all items did receive action, only the second 
and third deal with the actual prevention of terrorist 
acts before they occur. To these ends, there were 
noticeable improvements. 
Of great importance were the new and improved de-
tection devices introduced. Hijacking incidents during 
1971 were studied for further insights into hijacker 
motivations and psychological types for updating of 
screening materials. A considerably more sophisticated 
magnetometer than the model initially put in service 
was being tested at the year's end by the Department of 
Transportation at Washington's Dulles International Air-
port, a model aided by a computer and capable of de-
tecting nonferrous as well as ferrous objects and of 
distinguishing guns from other metal objects. 
The combined efforts of government and industry 
have established a baseline for the state of the arts 
including weapon detection, bomb detection, behavioral 
screening, detecting nonlethal weapons, developing 
communication systems, and electronic systems for security. 
A fast neutron activation analysis system for de-
tecting concealed explosives has been given a tentative 
health and welfare clearance, and the design of an 
operational version is under way. FAA has initiated 
plans for an operational test of a pulse X-ray system for 
detection of explosives in baggage. The Transportation 
Systems Center has initiated plans for evaluation of an 
economized version employing a new image intensifier 
screen. The system, with higher light output and resolu-
tion than present screens, has potential for signifi-
cantly improving detection of bombs and contraband in 
baggage and cargo. 
A successful demonstration of detection of explo-
sives by K-9 Corp dogs was coordinated by the FAA, 
leading to plans to have a set of dogs trained to handle 
bomb threats at the Washington National Airport. In 
addition, in-flight security was enhanced by the design 
and development by the FAA of a prototype armored 
cockpit.12 
Fiscal year 1972 int~oduced a new American .air piracy 
act, that of extortion~ After the initial successful 
extortion of $200,000 in cash, similar incidents oc-
curred which resulted in the mandatory screening of 
all passengers boarding an aircraft, a requirement for 
air carriers to submit to the government for approval 
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an anti-hijacking program, and set down security 
standards for airports regularily serving scheduled 
air carriers. This period saw thirty-four acts of 
piracy vice thirty-one for fiscal year 1971, but the 
important measuring stick is that only thirty-five 
percent were successful as compared to sixty percent 
in fiscal year 1971,lJ 
Fiscal year l.973 signaled the "end" of the terrorist 
acts of air piracy. Eleven attempts were made to hi-
jack with only three being successful and those in calen-
dar year 1972. 
The 1974 aviation security records confirmed that 
the drop in attempted hijackings achieved in 1973 was 
not an accident, No U.S. aircraft was hijacked during 
fiscal year 1974, and the number of attempts fell from 
eleven to four. Significantly, no hijackings were 
attempted in the air. Two hijackers who forced their 
way aboard a passenger aircraft on the ground were not suc-
cessful, One killed himself after being wounded by an 
airport policeman, and the other was disarmed and 
captured. In two attempted hijackings of helicopters, 
both culprits were apprehended. 
There is little doubt that the airport and airline 
security measures instituted in 1972, and subsequently 
improved, were instrumental in containing the hijacking 
threat, The effectiveness of the pre-boarding screening 
procedures is demonstrated by fiscal year 1974 statis-
tics: a total of 4,275 passengers were denied boarding 
privileges for security reasons; 655 others were arrested 
for carrying weapons; and 2,843 guns and other weapons 
were confiscated. 
While hijackings were prevented in 1974, bomb 
threats continued to plague security officials. Airports 
reported 221 bomb threats and 1,138 threats were made 
against aircraft, These figures compare to 1,424 air-
craft threats and 146 airport threats in 1973. 
To counteract the problem, the FAA sponsored an 
Explosive Detection Dog Handler Team Program, under a 
grant from the Law Enfo~cement Assi~tance Adm~nistration. 
Nineteen teams were trained and assigned to airports by 
the end of 1974. Seminars in bomb detection and aviat!on 
explosives security were held throughout the country,l 






success with not a single U.S. air carrier being 
successfully hijacked during fiscal year 1975, During 
that year 5,041 air carrier passengers were referred 
to law enforcement officers for security reasons and 
2,714 were arrested and 92,355 weapons and dangerous 
articles were detected.15 
As can be traced through history, there had been 
a rise and fall of air piracy within the United States 
starting in 1961 and hasically ending in 1972. It 
appears, however, that due to the inactivity of aerial 
hijacking, there has been a corresponding lack of 
security development during the lull years. As 
evidence of this, on September 10, 1976, there was a 
successful hijacking by Creation Nationalists for 
apparently political motives. This was accomplished 
by the use of harmless components carried on board the 
aircraft by different individuals and then assembled 
on board into what appeared to be a convincing pot bomb. 
To insure the authenticity of the fake bomb, a genuine 
bomb, similar in construction, was placed in a trans-
portation center locker. 
The alarming fact is that the screening system 
worked exactly as it had been designed to work. The 
pot container had even been detected but allowed to 
pass as luggage. Likewise, the other items used in 
the construction of th'e fake bomb had either been 
passed or were not detected as critical safety items. 
In view of this recent development, it appears that 
new or iiproved security measures are likely to 
follow.l 
The stark realization of this new successful type 
of hijacking is that national policy directed towards 
hijacking is driven by the acts themselves and not by 
forethought. The actual prevention of terrorist acts 
can realistically be viewed as only two alternatives: 
the first is the reliance upon an increased police 
type manpower; and the second is the expansion and 
development of electronic or other devices to compli-
ment law enforcement. 
An important consideration in settling upon the 
optimum security is the evaluation of its cost effec-
tiveness. In conclusion, the United States Government 
and its policy at this point in time should be sophis-
ticated enough and responsible enough not to have to 
wait for a new rash of catastrophic incidents or 
innovative hijackers to produce counter actions. 
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Policy should be able to start with the fact that in 
this country, transit patrons must be considered easy 
prey to those who choose to generate income or polit i cal 
notoriety through acts of air terror . 17 Thus, the area 
of predicting future courses of action to prevent future 
possible incidents of air hijackings must be studied 
and evaluated for effectiveness on a continuing basis, 
and not solely in response to a specific act or 
occurrence of terrorism. If not, it will only be a 
matter of time until we witness another, possibly 
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